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ESSAY
PROFILING ORIGINALISM
Jamal Greene,* Nathaniel Persily** & Stephen Ansolabehere***
Originalism is a subject of both legal and political discourse, invoked
not just in law review scholarship but also in popular media and public
discussion.  This Essay presents the first empirical study of public attitudes
about originalism.  The study analyzes original and existing survey data in
order to better understand the demographic characteristics, legal views, politi-
cal orientation, and cultural profile of those who self-identify as originalists.
We conclude that rule of law concerns, support for politically conservative
issue positions, and a cultural orientation toward moral traditionalism and
libertarianism are all significant predictors of an individual preference for
originalism.  Our analysis suggests that originalism has currency not only as
a legal proposition about constitutional interpretation, but also as a political
commodity and as a culturally expressive idiom.
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INTRODUCTION
Originalism has gone mainstream.  Two of the largest Tea Party orga-
nizations have been at odds on occasion,1 but they both agree on a com-
mitment to the intentions of the Framers.  Tea Party Nation describes
itself as “a user-driven group of like-minded people who desire our God-
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
** Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law and Political Science, Columbia Law
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*** Professor of Government, Harvard University.
The authors would like to thank Amy Semet for exceptional research assistance, and
Brittany Schoepp for editorial assistance.  This paper has benefited from comments
received at workshops at the University of Chicago, Columbia, Duke, George Washington,
Pace, William & Mary, and Yale Law Schools.
1. See Amy Gardner, Tea Party Faces Challenge of No Leader, Single Goal, Wash.
Post, Sept. 22, 2010, at A02 (discussing row over cancellation of convention planned by Tea
Party Nation).
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given individual freedoms written out by the Founding Fathers.”2  That
entails a belief in “Limited Government, Free Speech, the 2nd Amend-
ment, our Military, Secure Borders and our Country.”3  Another promi-
nent group, Tea Party Patriots, lists among its core values that “[w]e be-
lieve that it is possible to know the original intent of the government our
founders set forth, and stand in support of that intent.”4  For them, this
means support for “Fiscal Responsibility, Constitutionally Limited Gov-
ernment, and Free Markets.”5
Meanwhile, in the legal academy, hands have been wrung and much
ink has been spilled over whether, to paraphrase Thomas Jefferson, we
are all now originalists.6  Michael Perry is among the first to have made
that suggestion in print, and in a sense he is surely correct.7  Most respon-
sible constitutional interpretation begins with the original meaning of the
text; the differences are over the content and generality of that meaning,
and what judges should do when it does not provide clear answers to
modern legal disputes.8  Hence Perry’s conclusion, completing the Jeffer-
sonian analogy, that just as we are all originalists, none of us is an
originalist.9  The question of the degree to which judges and legal aca-
demics should commit themselves to the Constitution’s original meaning
acquired new life after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in District of
Columbia v. Heller, in which both the majority10 and the principal dis-
sent11 used originalist methods in analyzing whether the Second Amend-
ment protects an individual right to handgun possession in the home.
2. Tea Party Nation, at http://www.teapartynation.com (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
3. Id.
4. Tea Party Patriots, Mission Statement and Core Values, at http://www.teaparty
patriots.org/Mission.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 17,
2010).
5. Id.
6. See Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in 9 The Works of
Thomas Jefferson 193, 195 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905) (“We are all republicans:  we
are all federalists.”).
7. See Michael J. Perry, Morality, Politics and Law 280 (1988) [hereinafter Perry,
Morality] (“There is a sense in which we are all originalists:  We all believe that
constitutional adjudication should be grounded in the origin—the text that is at our origin
and, indeed, is our origin.”).
8. See Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional
Interpretation, 77 Va. L. Rev. 669, 694 (1991) (“The more specific the original meaning,
the greater the constraint; the more general the meaning, the lesser the constraint and the
greater the latitude for what is sometimes called judicial ‘discretion’ in ‘applying’ the
provision to the case at hand.”).
9. See Perry, Morality, supra note 7, at 280 (“But there is a sense, too, in which none R
of us is an originalist: . . . [W]e cannot travel back to the origin, no matter how hard we try,
and we deceive ourselves if we think we can.”).
10. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790 & n.6 (2008) (examining
text of Constitution and “other founding-era documents” to determine scope of Second
Amendment right).
11. See id. at 2831–36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reviewing text and constitutional
drafting history of Second Amendment).
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We have described two related but distinct conversations, one popu-
lar and the other professional, but the precise relationship between them
is mysterious.  On one hand, it is clear that many who promote and affili-
ate with originalism in popular discourse believe that their views should
have purchase in courts of law.12  On the other hand, it is not clear that
frequent invocations of the founding fathers or original intent on cable
news, on talk radio, or even at Supreme Court confirmation hearings has
much at all to do with the serious work of historians and legal scholars.13
“[O]riginalism has long since reached beyond the courts,” Jill Lepore
writes.  “Set loose in the culture, it looks like history but it’s not.  It is to
history what astrology is to astronomy, what alchemy is to chemistry, what
creationism is to evolution.”14  Who is right?
We can imagine at least three different, though not mutually exclu-
sive, understandings of originalism’s prominence within popular culture.
First, we might expect relative enthusiasm for originalism to align with
support for the kinds of rule of law values of democracy and transparency
that many of its proponents in the legal profession celebrate.15  Second,
we might imagine originalism to be associated with a set of political out-
comes or, alternatively, with a particular political ideology, and supported
by those who wish to promote those outcomes or who affiliate with that
ideology.16  Finally, we might believe that originalism is as much a cul-
tural phenomenon as a narrowly legal or political one.  In other words,
affiliation with originalism might be associated with certain cultural ori-
entations, such as hierarchical, individualistic, or egalitarian ways of
thinking—or with their opposites.  This last suggestion resonates with the
12. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Geo. L.J. 657, 672–96 (2009)
[hereinafter Greene, Selling Originalism] (describing integration of social and political
movement behind originalism into professional discourse); Kate Zernike, Beyond New
Deal, N.Y. Times, July 3, 2010, at A9 (“When Republicans pressed [Elena] Kagan on the
Constitution’s commerce clause and whether she was a legal progressive, they were
speaking not just about academic abstractions, but about the very ideas that animate
the . . . [Tea Party] movement.”).
13. For a discussion of originalism in bestselling books, blogs, popular speeches, and
newspaper editorials, see Zernike, supra note 12. R
14. Jill Lepore, Tea and Sympathy:  Who Owns the American Revolution?, New
Yorker, May 3, 2010, at 26, 31.
15. See Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty:  A Progressive Alternative to
Textualism and Originalism?, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2415 (2006) (reviewing Stephen
Breyer, Active Liberty:  Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (2005)) (“The point is
that in principle the textualist-originalist approach supplies an objective basis for judgment
that does not merely reflect the judge’s own ideological stance.”); Antonin Scalia,
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of United States Federal Courts in
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation:  Federal Courts and
the Law 3, 39 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts]
(arguing nonoriginalist judges typically interpret the Constitution according to what they
believe it “ought to mean”).
16. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:  Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism
in Heller, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 191, 241 (2008) (arguing “[t]he New Right embraced
originalism as the jurisprudential vehicle” for its conservative political claims).
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work of scholars such as Dan Kahan and Donald Braman, who posit that
cultural predisposition variables go a long way toward predicting certain
policy views.17
The questions of whether, to what degree, and how popular support
for originalism aligns with the robust professional debate over the subject
lend themselves to empirical answers, but to date no one has explored
these questions empirically.  This Essay begins to fill that gap.  As dis-
cussed in Part I, we rely on data from three surveys:  a series of polls
between 2003 and 2010 in which the Quinnipiac University Polling Insti-
tute asked Americans about their views on the Supreme Court’s reliance
on original intentions;18 the Cooperative Congressional Election Study
(CCES), conducted in October and November 2008;19 and an original
panel survey, the Constitutional Attitudes Survey (CAS), that we commis-
sioned in July 2009 and July 2010.20  The CAS, which drives most of our
analysis, asked for respondents’ views on originalism, and asked other
questions concerning principles of constitutional interpretation.  It also
included all the standard demographic and ideological variables in most
public opinion surveys, questions concerning salient issues that have re-
cently come before the Supreme Court, and a battery of questions popu-
larized by the American National Election Studies (ANES) that measure
cultural values such as libertarianism, egalitarianism, and moral
traditionalism.
As we discuss in Part II, our various measures of originalism reveal
both coherence and inconsistency in public attitudes concerning meth-
ods of constitutional interpretation.  On one hand, most respondents be-
17. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion:  A Cultural
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1291, 1294–95 (2003) (arguing cultural
disposition rather than objective evaluation of empirical evidence explains views on gun
rights).
18. Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ., Obama’s Bounce Goes Flat, Quinnipiac
University National Poll Finds; but Voters Confident He Will Pick Good Judge (Apr. 21,
2010); Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ., American Voters Oppose Same-Sex Marriage
Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds, but They Don’t Want Government to Ban It
(July 17, 2008); Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ., Voters Back Supreme Court Limit on
School Deseg[regation] 3–1 Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Approval of
Congress Drops to Lowest Point Ever (Aug. 16, 2007); Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ.,
Supreme Court Nominee Should Speak Up on Abortion, U.S. Voters Tell Quinnipiac
University National Poll; Bush Approval Drops to New Low (July 27, 2005); Press Release,
Quinnipiac Univ., U.S. Voters Back Roe v. Wade 2–1, Support Filibusters, Quinnipiac
University National Poll Finds; Bush Approval at Lowest Point Ever (May 25, 2005); Press
Release, Quinnipiac Univ., Supreme Court Should Listen to the People, Americans Tell
Quinnipiac University Poll; 2–1 Are Opposed to Race-Based College Admissions (Mar. 5,
2003) [hereinafter Quinnipiac Surveys] (all on file with the Columbia Law Review).
19. Stephen Ansolabehere, Guide to the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election
Survey (2009) [hereinafter CCES] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
background, methodology, and results of survey).
20. Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Knowledge Networks, Field Report:
Constitutional Attitudes Survey 38–113 (2010) [hereinafter Constitutional Attitudes
Survey] (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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lieve judges ought to factor original intent into their interpretations of
the Constitution.  On the other, very few believe it should be determina-
tive.  Even those who ally themselves with originalism as an abstract con-
cept tend to sacrifice originalism as an interpretive value in a concrete
context—such as when asked to read a right to privacy into the Constitu-
tion, or when given a forced choice between other values they consider
important.
With all that said, those who express the originalist option in the
Quinnipiac question, as well as those who can be fairly characterized as
most originalist according to an index derived from all relevant questions
in the CAS, exhibit the demographic and ideological characteristics one
would expect.  We present the demographic and ideological breakdown
of originalists and nonoriginalists in Part III.  It should come as little sur-
prise that originalists share the characteristics traditionally associated with
political conservatives.  Originalism is part of a bundle of ostensibly meth-
odological commitments that opinion leaders and the media associate
with the Republican Party, and so it is hardly surprising that originalists
seem to support conservative outcomes.21
The expected correlation between conservative and originalist atti-
tudes represents only the beginning of our analysis, however.  We also
wish to understand what types of political and cultural issue positions
seem best to predict whether one is an originalist.  Do attitudes on issues
such as abortion, same-sex marriage, and gun rights show additional pre-
dictive power not captured by generic labels, such as conservative, or by
demographic predictors, such as religiosity?  How much of a role do val-
ues of moral traditionalism, libertarianism, and egalitarianism play in pre-
dicting whether someone is an originalist?  Part IV engages in this kind of
multivariate analysis.
Our data are consistent with the proposition that originalism is sali-
ent within the public mind not simply as a political commodity or parti-
san slogan, but also as a legal argument and as a culturally embedded
meme.  The possible penetration of legal professional norms into the
public consciousness is not only of intrinsic interest to those who wish to
understand public attitudes toward the law, but also implicates several
debates within the scholarly literature.  Attempting to unravel competing
accounts for the public’s methodological choices seems particularly ur-
gent for popular constitutionalists, who believe that constitutional inter-
pretation should be broadly responsive to political and social move-
21. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes:  Recognizing the
Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1069, 1073 (2006) (remarking
that Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, the Court’s two most originalist Justices, appear to
“see a great parallel between the ‘originalist’ Constitution and the 2004 Republican Party
platform”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and the
Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 543, 554 (2005) (“[O]ur parties now
seem to be divided on originalism, with the Republican Party much more sympathetic to
originalism and the Democratic Party opposed.”).
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ments.22  Both the level of political and legal knowledge the American
people have, and the direction of influence between popular movements
and legal methodological practice, may implicate whether popular consti-
tutionalists are able to articulate a normatively attractive vision of consti-
tutional interpretation.  Insofar as cultural factors are significant but
nonexclusive predictors of attitudes toward originalism, our data also
lend moderate support to the views of Kahan and Braman and other cul-
tural theorists who believe that such factors predominate.  Our data are
also consistent with the possibility that, at a sufficiently broad level of ab-
straction, Americans have nontrivial levels of legal and political knowl-
edge—an assertion that is the subject of some debate.23  Finally, apart
from legal and political theory, these data might be useful to political
strategists who seek to reframe debates of constitutional importance and,
more specifically, to understand the avenues of influence on the judicial
confirmation process.
I. THE SURVEYS
We rely on data from three sets of surveys:  the Quinnipiac series,24
the CCES,25 and the CAS.26  Each survey included one common ques-
tion—the “Quinnipiac question”—on originalism, which states as follows:
22. See generally Barry Friedman, The Will of the People:  How Public Opinion Has
Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution (2009)
[hereinafter Friedman, Will of the People] (arguing Supreme Court generally follows
public opinion); Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves:  Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review (2004) (advocating revival of constitutional interpretation by the American
people rather than by judges); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage:  Democratic
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373 (2007) [hereinafter Post &
Siegel, Roe Rage] (defending model of “democratic constitutionalism” that accords
prominent role for citizens to engage with courts on constitutional interpretation through
dialectic process).
23. Compare Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty:
A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 Iowa L. Rev.
1287, 1304 (2004) (“Decades of research on political knowledge have uniformly showed it
to be very low.”), with James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and
Confirmations:  Positivity Theory and the Judgments of the American People 17 (2009)
(“Even though widely accepted, the image of the American people as ignorant about
courts rests upon a remarkably thin layer of empirical evidence.”).
24. The Quinnipiac results are based on telephone interviews conducted in February
and March 2003, May 2005, July 2005, August 2007, July 2008, and April 2010.  The surveys
conducted in 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2010 polled a national sample of registered voters or
likely voters, with sample sizes ranging from 920 to 1,930; the 2003 survey polled a national
sample of 1,448 adults.  Quinnipiac Surveys, supra note 18. R
25. The CCES is a national survey commissioned by thirty research teams from more
than thirty universities and coordinated through the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
political science department.  The 2008 CCES was conducted over the Internet by the
polling firm YouGov/Polimetrix, and the panel including the originalism question was
part of a 2,000-person national panel.  The CCES was in the field in two waves in October
and November of 2008.  CCES, supra note 19, at 1–2, 9. R
26. The Constitutional Attitudes Survey was conducted in 2009 and 2010 by
Knowledge Networks, which derives its sample from telephone- and address-based polls
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Which comes closer to your point of view:
(A) In making decisions, the Supreme Court should only con-
sider the original intentions of the authors of the Constitution
or
(B) In making decisions, the Supreme Court should consider
changing times and current realities in applying the principles
of the Constitution.27
As this is the most consistently asked question regarding originalism,
it represents the starting point of our analysis.  Nevertheless, because
many valid objections can be raised to the wording of this particular ques-
tion,28 and because the responses do not appear entirely stable, we in-
cluded a variety of other measures of originalism in the CAS.
and then conducts the survey through the Internet (providing internet access to those who
otherwise do not have it).  Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, at 8–11.  The R
2009 CAS used a national sample of 1,677 adults.  Id. at 4–5.  It was in the field from July 6,
2009 to July 13, 2009, concluding just as the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings
commenced on the nomination of Justice Sonia Sotomayor.  Stephen Ansolabehere,
Knowledge Networks, Field Report:  Attitudes & Perceptions About the Constitution 4
(2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  The 2010 CAS reinterviewed 1,027 of the
respondents from the 2009 CAS, beginning on June 16, 2010 and concluding on July 6,
2010.  Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, at 4–5.  The survey period, therefore, R
included both the last few days of the Supreme Court’s term, when it issued several salient
decisions, and a few days of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s confirmation hearings for
Justice Elena Kagan.
27. Quinnipiac Surveys, supra note 18, at Questions 31 (2010 survey), 23 (2008 R
survey), 36 (2007 survey), 8 (July 2005 survey), 10 (May 2005 survey), 22 (2003 survey).
28. Close watchers of the academic debate around originalism will immediately notice
at least three potential problems with the phrasing of this question.  First, the “original
intentions” option is phrased as a binary question, whereas the “changing times” option is
not.  That is, this question allows a respondent to be coded as “originalist” only if she
believes that the Court should take “only” the original intentions of the Framers into
account.  A respondent who believes that “changing times and current realities” are
relevant, but that the original intentions of the Framers should predominate, would
conventionally be considered an originalist, but might not be identified as such by this
question.  Responses to the question may therefore overrepresent nonoriginalists.
Less obviously, a sophisticated view on constitutional interpretation need not regard
the two options as mutually exclusive.  One might reasonably believe that the original
intentions of the authors of relevant constitutional provisions were that the text be applied
in light of “changing times and current realities.”  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding.”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 885, 902–13 (1985) (arguing that authors of Constitution did not believe
their own subjective intentions would bind future generations); see also Alexander M.
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
61–65 (1955) (suggesting even if Fourteenth Amendment was not originally understood to
prohibit racial segregation, its language was deliberately broad enough to allow for
different future interpretations).  But see Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s
Accommodation of Social Change, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 239, 242 (1989) (“In general, . . .
neither Federalists nor Anti-Federalists thought it appropriate for constitutional law to
change in adaptation to social developments.”).
The third potential problem with the question is that it refers to the original
intentions of the authors of the Constitution rather than the original meaning of the
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The results of the Quinnipiac question from nine surveys over seven
years are presented in Table 1.29  Between 37% and 49% chose the
originalist option and between 42% and 60% chose the “changing times”
option.  The surveys vary somewhat in how easy it was for someone to
register a “don’t know” option, with the Quinnipiac surveys explicitly of-
fering “don’t know” as an option and the CAS requiring voters to skip the
question, for example.  Thus, the “true” share of originalists, according to
this question, probably hovers in the low forties, and the “true” share of
nonoriginalists probably hovers in the fifties.  We do not mean to make
much of the relative shares of those expressing originalist or nonoriginal-
ist responses, however.  These surveys are not elections where 50% is a
magic number; we cannot and should not say originalism has “lost” ac-
cording to these results.  Indeed, in the April 2010 Quinnipiac survey, a
greater share of respondents did, in fact, choose the originalist re-
sponse.30  Had we asked the question any number of other ways, we are
confident that a consistent majority would consider themselves originalist
according to a different metric.
constitutional text.  As is well known among constitutional theorists, most academic
originalists and many judges, including Justice Antonin Scalia, prefer the latter
formulation.  See Antonin Scalia, Response, in A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 15, R
at 129, 144–47 (stating focus should be “upon what the text would reasonably be
understood to mean, rather than upon what it was intended to mean”); see also Randy E.
Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611, 620 (1999) (noting
conceptual change in originalism “from original intention to original meaning”).
29. Throughout this Essay in Tables 1–3 and 5–7 and accompanying text, any totals
not equal to 100% are due to rounding.
30. We do not know for sure why such a great discrepancy exists between the 2010
Quinnipiac and 2010 CAS surveys, despite being separated by only two months.  Both
surveys are outliers, but in opposite directions.  Judging from responses to other questions
on those surveys, it appears that the CAS sample had a somewhat more favorable view of
Obama than did the Quinnipiac sample.  However, that would not account for the size of
the discrepancy.  It is also possible that some salient Supreme Court decisions issued
toward the end of the Court’s term and intervening between the surveys had some effect
picked up by the CAS but not the Quinnipiac survey.  Or perhaps the announcement of
Justice Elena Kagan’s nomination to the Court had some effect.  It also appears that the
Quinnipiac survey asked a number of questions about President Obama’s approval just
before asking about originalism, and these questions could have had a priming effect.
Although we view this discrepancy as cause for concern in the precision of our estimates of
the current share of the public that supports originalism, we do not think it casts doubt on
our profile of originalists or the variables that we think predict originalist attitudes.
Nevertheless, potential instability in responses to the Quinnipiac question further justifies
the approach we take here—that is, to create an index of originalism derived from several
questions rather than just one.
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Table 1.  Quinnipiac Originalism Question
Original Changing Don’t
Survey Intentions Times Know/NA
CAS (June 2010)31 37 60 4
Quinnipiac (Apr. 2010)32 49 42 9
CAS (July 2009)33 40 58 3
CCES (Nov. 2008)34 44 56 NA
Quinnipiac (July 2008)35 40 52 8
Quinnipiac (Aug. 2007)36 43 48 9
Quinnipiac (July 2005)37 44 50 6
Quinnipiac (May 2005)38 42 51 8
Quinnipiac (Mar. 2003)39 39 54 7
In fact, when we posed the question differently, almost every respon-
dent expressed some support for originalism as an interpretive value.  Em-
ploying a battery based on questions developed by political scientists
James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira,40 the 2009 CAS asked:  “How impor-
tant would you say it is for a good Supreme Court judge to . . . [u]phold
the values of those who wrote our constitution two hundred years ago?”41
Ninety-two percent said it was very or somewhat important, more than for
any other option presented to respondents, as described in Table 2.42
As the other questions in the same battery attest, however, a majority
of respondents appear to think all kinds of values are important for inter-
pretation.  Strong majorities, for example, believe that Supreme Court
Justices should “stay entirely independent of the President and Congress”
31. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Question 503a (2010), at 35,
106.
32. Quinnipiac Survey, supra note 18, Question 31 (2010 survey).
33. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Question 101 (2009), at 20, 51.
34. See CCES, supra note 19, Question V3081 (2008) (unpublished codebook).
35. Quinnipiac Survey, supra note 18, Question 23 (2008 survey).
36. Quinnipiac Survey, supra note 18, Question 36 (2007 survey).
37. Quinnipiac Survey, supra note 18, Question 8 (July 2005 survey).
38. Quinnipiac Survey, supra note 18, Question 10 (May 2005 survey).
39. Quinnipiac Survey, supra note 18, Question 22 (2003 survey).
40. See James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Confirmation Politics and the
Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court:  Institutional Loyalty, Positivity Bias, and the Alito
Nomination, 53 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 139, 147 (2009) [hereinafter Gibson & Caldeira,
Confirmation Politics] (studying which factors were most important to Americans when
forming their opinions on judicial nomination of Justice Samuel Alito).
41. Throughout the remainder of this Essay, survey question text, percentages, and
other data are based on the Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20.  For specific R
citation references, see Tables 2–9 that accompany the text.
42. As described later in this Essay, we characterize as “originalists” the top quartile of
the survey scoring highest on our originalism index derived from six questions asked on
the 2009 and 2010 CAS depicted in Tables 3 and 4.  The bottom quartile of scorers are
denoted as nonoriginalists.  See infra text accompanying note 58 (describing methodology R
in creating originalism index).
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and that they should “protect people without power from people and
groups with power.”  Even the politically contested notion of “empathy”
receives majority support (although the lowest in our battery)—that is,
59% believe it is very or somewhat important for Supreme Court Justices
to “feel empathy for the people involved in a case.”43
43. These findings are consistent with those of James Gibson in recent survey work.
He found that 74% of Americans believe that it is “very important” for Supreme Court
Justices to “uphold the values of those who wrote the U.S. constitution long ago” and 68%
consider it “very important” for such justices to “empathize with ordinary people.”  James
L. Gibson, Expecting Justice and Hoping for Empathy, Miller-McCune, June 20, 2010, at
http://www.miller-mccune.com/legal-affairs/expecting-justice-and-hoping-for-empathy-
17677/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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Table 2.  Responses to Judicial Values Questions as Broken Down by
Scores on Originalism Index44
How important would you Notsay it is for a good Very Somewhat Not Very ImportantSupreme Court judge Important Important Important at Allto . . .
Strictly follow the law no Originalists 69 25 4 3
matter what people in
Nonoriginalists 17 47 31 5the country may want?
Total 39 43 14 4
Feel empathy for the peo- Originalists 10 33 29 28
ple involved in a case? Nonoriginalists 15 44 29 11
Total 17 42 27 14
Protect people without Originalists 38 38 12 12
power from people and Nonoriginalists 48 45 3 5groups with power?
Total 53 35 8 5
Respect the will of the Originalists 23 38 18 21
majority of people in the Nonoriginalists 28 49 18 5
United States?
Total 34 40 17 9
Stay entirely independent Originalists 79 13 5 3
of the President and Con-
Nonoriginalists 42 38 16 4gress?
Total 58 32 8 3
Follow his or her con- Originalists 25 28 22 25
science or sense of moral-
Nonoriginalists 27 54 14 6ity?
Total 32 43 16 9
Respect existing Supreme Originalists 45 40 9 5
Court decisions by chang- Nonoriginalists 15 59 21 5ing the law as little as pos-
Total 31 48 16 5sible?
Uphold the values of Originalists 96 4 0 0
those who wrote our Con- Nonoriginalists 0 76 20 4stitution two hundred
Total 54 38 7 2years ago?
Although most Americans might be described as “constitutional plu-
ralists” when it comes to interpretive values,45 we can fairly array them on
an originalism continuum depending on their responses to several ques-
tions.  For example, 82% of respondents who answered “original intent”
to the Quinnipiac question in the 2009 CAS believed that it is very impor-
tant to uphold the values of the Framers, whereas only 35% of “changing
44. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Questions 102a–102h (2009),
at 20, 51–54.
45. See Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 Tex. L. Rev.
1753, 1753 (1994) (“Pluralistic theories of constitutional interpretation hold that there are
multiple legitimate methods of interpreting the Constitution.”).
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times” respondents held that view.46  Thus, although question wording
will greatly affect the share of the population identifying with an original-
ist option, most people tend to sort themselves in predictable directions
on the values they hold most important in interpreting the Constitution.
We are able to gauge coherence even better based on a second CAS
survey we conducted in June 2010.  We re-asked the same 2009 CAS re-
spondents several different questions concerning originalism.  The re-
sults largely confirmed the conclusions we reached from the earlier sur-
vey, but offered additional insights.  The results from those questions
appear in Table 3 and the correlations between all the originalism-related
questions from both survey years appear in Table 4.
Table 3.  Attitudes Toward Originalism
In general, do you agree or disagree with the
following statements about the United States Agree Agree Disagree Disagree
Supreme Court: Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
The Supreme Court should focus less on what
the Constitution meant when it was written 17 38 22 22and more on the effect its decisions will have
in today’s America.47
The Supreme Court should read the Constitu-
tion as a general set of principles whose mean- 21 41 19 19
ing changes over time.48
The Supreme Court should recognize a right
of privacy even though it is not explicitly 33 53 11 3
stated in the Constitution.49
46. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Questions 101 (2009), 102h R
(2009), at 20, 51, 54.
47. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Question 502bb (2010), at 31,
96.
48. See id., Question 502cc (2010), at 31, 97.
49. See id., Question 502aa (2010), at 31, 96.
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Table 4.  Correlations Between Originalism Items, 2009 and 2010 CAS
The
Supreme
Court
should
focus less The
on what Supreme
the Consti- Court
Judges tution should
should meant read the
uphold the when it Constitu-
values of was written tion as a The Supreme
those who and more general set Court should
wrote our on the of princi- recognize a
Constitu- effect its ples whose right of privacy
Quinnipiac Quinnipiac tion two decisions meaning even though it
wording wording hundred will have changes is not explicitly
(2009 (2010 years in today’s over stated in the
CAS)50 CAS)51 ago.52 America.53 time.54 Constitution.55
Quinnipiac wording (2009) 1
Quinnipiac wording (2010) 0.57 1
Judges should uphold the
values of those who wrote 0.40 0.36 1our Constitution two hun-
dred years ago.
The Supreme Court
should focus less on what
the Constitution meant
when it was written and 0.50 0.57 0.35 1
more on the effect its deci-
sions will have in today’s
America.
The Supreme Court
should read the Constitu-
tion as a general set of 0.55 0.58 0.31 0.74 1
principles whose meaning
changes over time.
The Supreme Court
should recognize a right of
privacy even though it is 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.28 0.31 1
not explicitly stated in the
Constitution.
Roughly similar population shares in 2009 and 2010 identify with the
abstract notion of originalism as revealed in the Quinnipiac question.
Slim majorities gravitate toward the nonoriginalist response in differently
worded questions, while substantial minorities express a preference for
the originalist position.  For example, 55% agreed and 45% disagreed
with the statement:  “The Supreme Court should focus less on what the
Constitution meant when it was written and more on the effect its deci-
sions will have in today’s America.”  Moreover, 62% agreed and 38% dis-
agreed with the statement:  “The Supreme Court should read the Consti-
tution as a general set of principles whose meaning changes over time.”
50. See id., Question 101 (2009), at 20, 51.
51. See id., Question 503a (2010), at 35, 106.
52. See id., Question 102h (2009), at 20, 54.
53. See id., Question 502bb (2010), at 31, 96.
54. See id., Question 502cc (2010), at 31, 97.
55. See id., Question 502aa (2010), at 31, 96.
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The exception to this rule lies in answers to a question concerning the
right to privacy.  When asked whether “[t]he Supreme Court should rec-
ognize a right of privacy even though it is not explicitly stated in the Con-
stitution,” 86% of respondents agreed.
Except for the privacy question, roughly the same share of respon-
dents chose the originalist option in these questions, but these are not
necessarily the same people.  Even among the identical survey respon-
dents asked the same Quinnipiac version of the originalism question in
both the 2009 and 2010 CAS, the correlation between their responses is
0.57, suggesting some instability in responses to that question.  Moreover,
the correlation between responses to the 2010 Quinnipiac question on
the CAS and the two other originalism items just mentioned—the effect
decisions have today and the Constitution as a set of principles that
changes over time—are 0.57 and 0.58, and the correlation with the Gib-
son and Caldeira version of the originalism question is even lower.
The low correlations between the “pure” originalism questions and
the right to privacy question are particularly noteworthy.56  The correla-
tion between responses on the privacy question is less than 0.2 with the
Quinnipiac question and approximately 0.3 with the other 2010 original-
ism questions.  In other words, a large share of the public and even self-
identified originalists want the Court to respect the right to privacy, re-
gardless of its connection to the constitutional text.  This finding goes
some way toward validating the view of skeptics that, while some “original-
ists” in the mass public may cling to the label because it sounds good or
coincides with other traditionalist notions, they really do not “mean it”
when confronted with its implications.57  The same might be said con-
cerning views of self-described originalists on First Amendment issues, on
which originalist Justices have expressed more libertarian views.  As Table
7 indicates, a majority of originalists, for example, think the following
should not be allowed:  flag burning, corporate tobacco advertisements,
selling of animal cruelty videos or violent video games, and corporate
spending on candidate elections.
We are neither surprised nor troubled by inconsistencies in original-
ist thinking by the mass public or their lack of fit with positions taken by
originalists on the Court.  Skeptics are undoubtedly correct that the mass
public does not have a completely worked out and consistent philosophy
concerning how to interpret the Constitution.  Indeed, we might even
question the completeness of such philosophies held by the elites of the
56. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment. 291,
291 (2007) (arguing right to privacy is commonly assumed by both sides of abortion debate
to be inconsistent with text, history, and structure of Constitution).
57. See Andrew B. Coan, Talking Originalism, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 847, 859 (arguing
even self-labeled originalists reject its strictest consequences, such as “permit[ting] the
segregation of public schools and other public facilities; bans on inter-racial marriage; all
manner of racial covenants in the sale of private property; bans on the sale of
contraceptives; and, quite possibly, established state churches”).
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competing schools of constitutional interpretation.  For us, the interest-
ing questions are what characteristics distinguish and predict whether
someone gravitates toward the originalist option in such surveys.  We do
not assume that originalism describes a fixed concept whose popularity is
being tested; we are more concerned with the associated ideological com-
mitments of those who affiliate with originalism.  The great majority of
Americans feel comfortable expressing one or another view on these
questions—even when given a “don’t know” option.  The data suggest
these choices are not randomly made, even if different people might
make such choices for reasons that possess greater or lesser ideological
coherence.  Our project is to identify the demographic and ideological
variables that characterize originalists, and specify the relative importance
of such factors in predicting who might call themselves originalists.
II. PROFILING ORIGINALISTS
To avoid the problems with question wording and framing that affect
each individual originalism question in our surveys, we constructed an
originalism index based upon a principal components factor analysis of
the six originalism questions in the 2009 and 2010 CAS.58  Someone who
gave the originalist answer to all such questions would receive the highest
originalism “score” and someone who gave the originalist answer to none
of those questions would receive the lowest score.  The more questions to
which one gave an originalist answer, the higher the score one received.
For purposes of the tables that follow, we call the top quartile of scorers
on the originalism index “originalists” and the lowest quartile “no-
noriginalists.”  However, as we stress throughout, originalism represents a
continuum in opinion, in which people can be arrayed as more or less
originalist.
As we are using it, factor analysis seeks to identify a latent variable—
originalism—that underlies a series of correlated variables.  By creating
an index of originalism in this way, we can attempt to mitigate the ques-
tion wording and priming effects of the types described earlier in this
Essay.59  There are some shortcomings to this approach as well, given that
the 2010 survey, which contains the multiple originalism-related ques-
tions that help form the index, surveyed many fewer respondents (about
1,000, as compared to 1,600), and that many of our independent vari-
58. These questions include (1) the Quinnipiac question in both surveys, (2) the
question as to the importance of Supreme Court Justices to “[u]phold the values of those
who wrote our [C]onstitution two hundred years ago,” as well as agreement or
disagreement with the following statements:  (3) “The Supreme Court should focus less on
what the Constitution meant when it was written and more on the effect its decisions will
have in today’s America,” (4) “The Supreme Court should read the Constitution as a
general set of principles whose meaning changes over time,” and (5) “The Supreme Court
should recognize a right of privacy even though it is not explicitly stated in the
Constitution.”  Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Questions 101 (2009), 503a R
(2010), 102h (2009), 502aa–502cc (2010), at 20, 31, 35, 51, 54, 96–97, 106.
59. See supra notes 28, 30. R
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ables come from questions asked a year earlier.  Nevertheless, we suspect
that this approach gets closer to measuring the latent originalism variable
toward which each question gestures, and specifically addresses the legiti-
mate criticisms one could have of the Quinnipiac question as an “authen-
tic” measure of originalism.
We begin with the demographic profile of originalists.  We expect
that originalists are likely to be conservative and Republican, and we ex-
pect that those demographic characteristics known to be associated with
conservatism and Republican Party identification will also be predomi-
nant among originalists.  The demographic profile of originalists is
presented in Table 5.
Table 5.  The Demographic Profile of Originalists
Race60
Other, 2+ Races,
White Black Non-Hispanic Hispanic Non-Hispanic
Originalist 86 2 7 4 1
Nonoriginalist 63 18 5 14 1
Total 68 12 5 14 1
Gender61
Male Female
Originalist 57 43
Nonoriginalist 48 52
Total 48 52
Age62
18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65–74 75+
Originalist 5 10 22 16 24 15 9
Nonoriginalist 10 28 19 17 13 9 4
Total 8 21 19 18 17 11 6
60. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Background Demographic
Variables (2010), at 87.
61. See id. at 88.
62. See id. at 86.
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Education63
Bachelor’s
Less than High Some Degree or
High School School College Higher
Originalist 6 28 32 34
Nonoriginalist 10 23 28 39
Total 14 31 28 27
Metro64
Metro Not Metro
Originalist 80 20
Nonoriginalist 89 11
Total 84 16
Region65
Northeast Midwest South West
Originalist 18 23 41 17
Nonoriginalist 27 17 36 20
Total 18 22 37 23
Income ($K)66
0–25 25–49.9 50–74.9 75–99.9 100–124.9 125–149.9 150–174.9 175+
Originalist 23 22 19 18 6 7 3 3
Nonoriginalist 24 23 17 21 7 4 2 3
Total 27 24 19 16 6 4 2 2
Employment Status67
Working Not Working
Originalist 64 36
Nonoriginalist 61 39
Total 56 44
Literal Truth of Bible68
Do Not Believe in Believe in
Literal Truth Literal Truth
Originalist 24 76
Nonoriginalist 65 35
Total 41 59
63. See id. at 87.
64. See id. at 89.
65. See id. at 90.
66. See id. at 89.
67. See id. at 93.
68. See id., Question 5 (2009), at 18, 49.
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Religious Service Attendance69
More than Once or A Few
Once per Once per Twice a Times a Once a
Week Week Month Year Year Never
Originalist 24 33 6 15 11 12
Nonoriginalist 4 14 11 21 16 34
Total 12 20 9 17 14 28
Evangelicalism70
Not Born- Born-
Again/Evangelical Again/Evangelical
Christian Christian
Originalist 48 52
Nonoriginalist 83 17
Total 68 32
In particular, we look at gender, race, age, education, region, urban-
ization, and religiosity.  Originalists are somewhat more likely than no-
noriginalists to be male, white, and older.  They are also more likely to
live in rural areas and in the South.  None of these differences are surpris-
ing or even that substantial, and with respect to education there is almost
no difference.  The starkest differences in the cross-tabulations, however,
appear concerning religiosity, where 52% of originalists describe them-
selves as born-again or evangelical, as compared to only 17% of no-
noriginalists.  Similarly, 57% of originalists attend religious services at
least once per week, as compared to 18% of nonoriginalists.  Also, 76% of
originalists believe in the literal truth of the Bible, whereas only 35% of
nonoriginalists do.
As we discuss in our multivariate analysis, in which originalism is the
dependent variable, most such demographic differences do not appear
statistically significant once one controls for ideology and partisanship.
As presented in Table 6a, originalists are more likely to be Republican
and conservative than nonoriginalists.  Eighty-five percent of originalists
identify as or lean toward Republican, and 76% describe themselves as
conservative, whereas 21% of nonoriginalists identify as or lean toward
Republican, and 14% are conservative.  As such, originalists are naturally
less likely to approve of the job performance of President Obama and the
111th Congresses.  As shown in Table 6b, a sizable share of originalists—
over two-thirds—also describe themselves as supporting the Tea Party
movement.
69. See id., Question 27 (2009), at 16, 79.
70. See id., Question 26a (2010), at 36, 108.
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Table 6a.  The Partisan and Ideological Profile of Originalists
Party Identification71
Strong Not Not Strong
Dem. Strong Dem. Leans Dem. Leans Rep. Strong Rep. Rep.
Originalist 3 5 6 34 14 37
Nonoriginalist 22 30 28 7 9 5
Total 19 19 19 17 12 14
Ideology72
Extreme Slight Slight Extreme
Liberal Liberal Liberal Moderate Cons. Cons. Cons.
Originalist 0 3 3 17 15 46 15
Nonoriginalist 5 22 15 44 8 6 0
Total 4 16 11 36 12 18 4
Approval of Obama73
Strongly Approve Disapprove Strongly
Approve Somewhat Somewhat Disapprove
Originalist 6 9 18 67
Nonoriginalist 25 55 13 7
Total 17 37 20 26
Approval of Congress74
Strongly Approve Disapprove Strongly
Approve Somewhat Somewhat Disapprove
Originalist 2 11 25 62
Nonoriginalist 1 39 50 10
Total 2 30 41 27
Table 6b.  Tea Party Support as Predictor of Originalism75
Do you support the Tea Party movement?
Do Not Support Support Tea
Tea Party Movement Party Movement
Originalist 21 79
Nonoriginalist 68 32
Total 52 48
71. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Questions 8–10 (2010), at 37,
109–10.
72. See id., Question 11 (2010), at 37, 110.
73. See id., Question 500 (2010), at 31, 94.
74. See id., Question 600 (2010), at 35–36, 107.
75. See id., Question 519a (2010), at 33, 103.
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Our surveys, however, allow us to go further than these simple labels
in assessing the ideological divergence of originalists and nonoriginalists.
The survey included a battery of oft-used questions to measure a respon-
dent’s level of moral traditionalism, libertarianism, and egalitarianism.
These questions form indexes, often used by the ANES,76 by which re-
searchers can assess the extent to which a respondent adheres to egalita-
rian versus hierarchical thinking, morally traditional as compared to less
traditional attitudes, and libertarian versus “pro-government” beliefs.  Ta-
bles 6c, 6d, and 6e present the data from these batteries of questions,
broken down by originalists and nonoriginalists.
As one might suspect, originalists are relatively more hierarchical,
morally traditionalist, and libertarian in their thinking.  The more inter-
esting questions for us concern the size of the gaps between originalists
and nonoriginalists on these questions, the degree to which one or an-
other cluster of values seems to reveal differences more than the other
clusters, and which value clusters are statistically significant predictors as
to whether one identifies with originalism, all else being equal.  For ex-
ample, on most of the measures of egalitarianism, originalists differ from
nonoriginalists by an average of approximately 30 percentage points in
their level of agreement.  Whereas 83% of originalists agree with the
statement “[w]e have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this coun-
try,” only 41% of nonoriginalists agree.  In contrast, 67% of nonoriginal-
ists agree that “[i]f people were treated more equally in this country we
would have many fewer problems,” whereas only 34% of originalists
agree.
76. See generally Am. Nat’l Election Studies, at http://www.electionstudies.org (last
visited Nov. 12, 2010).
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Table 6c.  Profiling Originalists:  Egalitarianism77
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly
Agree Somewhat Somewhat Disagree
Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal
opportunity to succeed.
Originalist 31 32 24 13
Nonoriginalist 43 45 9 3
Total 44 38 13 5
We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
Originalist 38 45 10 7
Nonoriginalist 9 32 33 26
Total 20 35 27 18
One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal chance.
Originalist 11 12 38 39
Nonoriginalist 18 39 36 8
Total 19 32 32 17
This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.
Originalist 34 44 16 6
Nonoriginalist 4 37 37 21
Total 16 37 29 17
It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than
others.
Originalist 18 36 38 9
Nonoriginalist 5 27 42 26
Total 8 31 38 22
If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.
Originalist 12 22 40 25
Nonoriginalist 20 47 27 7
Total 20 40 28 12
The differences are even starker in the battery of questions concern-
ing moral traditionalism.  Indeed, given the emphasis on change versus
stability in any question that attempts to measure originalist leanings, we
would expect traditionalism (moral or otherwise) to constitute a fault line
for the two groups.  Divergent levels of agreement with the statement—
“[t]he world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral
behavior to those changes”—represent a case in point; only 14% of
originalists agree with that statement, but 76% of nonoriginalists do.
Large (and expected) gaps also exist between the two groups on whether
“[t]he newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society,”
whether “[w]e should be more tolerant of people who choose to live ac-
cording to their own moral standards,” and whether “[t]his country
77. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Questions 3a–3f (2009), at 29,
72–74.
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would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on tradi-
tional family ties.”
Table 6d.  Profiling Originalists:  Moral Traditionalism78
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly
Agree Somewhat Somewhat Disagree
The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those
changes.
Originalist 4 10 19 67
Nonoriginalist 18 58 19 6
Total 15 36 25 24
The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.
Originalist 58 32 6 4
Nonoriginalist 13 38 31 18
Total 29 40 21 10
We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral
standards, even if they are very different from our own.
Originalist 7 26 35 31
Nonoriginalist 28 52 15 5
Total 18 47 22 12
This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on
traditional family ties.
Originalist 68 27 2 3
Nonoriginalist 18 37 29 16
Total 39 37 16 8
With respect to libertarianism, plausible hypotheses could point in
different directions as to whether originalists or nonoriginalists are more
likely to be libertarian.  As in the “real world” of politics, it might depend
on whether one asks questions focused on economic or social libertarian-
ism.  In other words, we would expect conservatives, and therefore
originalists, to be more economically libertarian on issues such as taxes
and spending, while liberals and nonoriginalists would be more liberta-
rian on issues such as abortion and privacy rights.  The forced choices in
the ANES libertarianism battery, however, tend to frame the libertarian
response in terms somewhat more consistent with the conservative brand
of libertarianism, expressing self-reliance and fear of big government.
Unlike the previous batteries, the three questions forming the libertarian-
ism battery are posed as forced-choice responses between a pair of op-
tions that each ask “which comes closer to your view.”  For example,
originalists are more likely—89% as compared to 44% of nonoriginal-
ists—to say “[t]he main reason government has become bigger over the
years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for
78. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Questions 4a–4d (2009), at 29,
74–75.
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themselves,” rather than “[g]overnment has become bigger because the
problems we face have become bigger.”  Eighty-seven percent of original-
ists—as compared to 35% of nonoriginalists—choose the statement
“[t]he less government the better” as opposed to “[t]here are more
things that government should be doing.”  Finally, the largest gap con-
cerns views on government and the economy.  Only 21% of originalists,
as opposed to 75% of nonoriginalists, believe “[w]e need a strong govern-
ment to handle today’s complex economic problems,” rather than “[t]he
free market can handle these problems without government being
involved.”
Table 6e.  Profiling Originalists:  Libertarianism79
Pair A
The main reason government has
become bigger over the years is
Government has become bigger because it has gotten involved in
because the problems we face have things that people should do
become bigger. for themselves.
Originalist 11 89
Nonoriginalist 56 44
Total 42 58
Pair B
We need a strong government to The free market can handle these
handle today’s complex problems without government
economic problems. being involved.
Originalist 21 79
Nonoriginalist 75 25
Total 61 39
Pair C
There are more things that
government should be doing. The less government the better.
Originalist 14 87
Nonoriginalist 65 35
Total 50 50
Finally, in completing our profiles of originalists and nonoriginalists,
we can move from abstract variables to concrete issue positions on salient
constitutional controversies.  Table 7 presents the differences between
originalists and nonoriginalists on an array of issues, including abortion,
gay rights, gun rights, school prayer, and the death penalty, among other
issues we surveyed.  Of course, originalists tend to favor the more “con-
79. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Question 6 Pairs A–C (2009),
at 29–30, 75–76.
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servative” position and nonoriginalists the more “liberal” position.  We
find more interesting the size of the gap (where one exists) between
originalists and nonoriginalists.  For example, it might seem obvious that
originalists would differ from nonoriginalists in their opinions on abor-
tion and Roe v. Wade.80  Indeed, when asked whether, “[i]n general, do
you agree or disagree with the 1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision
that established a woman’s right to an abortion?”, 31% of originalists
agreed, as compared to 82% of nonoriginalists—a 51 percentage point
gap.  Still, the fact that about a third of originalists agree with Roe is quite
striking.  Conversely, sizable majorities of both originalists and no-
noriginalists support an individualist interpretation of the Second
Amendment and oppose bans on handgun ownership, even though the
gap in support for gun regulations between the two groups is about 20 to
30 percentage points.  On gay rights questions, the differences appear
more pronounced.  Although majorities in both camps oppose bans on
sex between gays, they diverge on same-sex marriage and allowing gays to
serve openly in the military.  Only 9% of originalists as compared to 62%
of nonoriginalists support same-sex marriage at the state level, and only
39% of originalists as compared to 87% of nonoriginalists think gays
should be able to serve openly in the military.  Differences are much
smaller, in contrast, on issues such as the death penalty, literacy tests, free
speech, immigration, and eminent domain.
Table 7.  The Issue Positions of Originalists
In general, do you agree or disagree with the 1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision
that established a woman’s right to an abortion?81
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly
Agree Somewhat Somewhat Disagree
Originalist 11 20 21 48
Nonoriginalist 58 24 13 5
Total 37 29 14 21
Do you think marriages between same-sex couples should or should not be recognized
by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages?82
Yes, Should Be Recognized No, Should Not Be Recognized
Originalist 9 91
Nonoriginalist 62 38
Total 41 59
80. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
81. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Question 510 (2010), at 32, 99.
82. See id., Question 204 (2009), at 21, 55.
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Quite apart from whether you think same-sex marriage should be legal in your state, do
you think that the federal government should recognize same-sex marriages in states
where it is legal?83
Yes, Should Be Recognized No, Should Not Be Recognized
Originalist 16 84
Nonoriginalist 67 33
Total 48 52
A recent case challenged a Texas law that banned sexual relations between consenting
adults of the same gender.  Would you support a state law banning sex between people
of the same gender?84
No, Do Not Support Ban Yes, Support Ban
Originalist 54 46
Nonoriginalist 87 13
Total 70 30
In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  Gays and lesbians
should be able to serve openly in the military.85
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly
Agree Somewhat Somewhat Disagree
Originalist 13 26 20 41
Nonoriginalist 53 34 9 4
Total 37 31 15 18
Should the government be allowed to apply the death penalty to an adult convicted of
murder?86
No Yes
Originalist 15 85
Nonoriginalist 31 69
Total 22 78
In general, do you believe that public schools should be permitted to start each school
day with a prayer?87
No Yes
Originalist 13 87
Nonoriginalist 50 50
Total 33 67
83. See id., Question 205 (2009), at 21, 55.
84. See id., Question 206 (2009), at 21, 56.
85. See id., Question 511b (2010), at 32, 98.
86. See id., Question 207a (2009), at 22, 56.
87. See id., Question 208 (2009), at 22, 58.
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In general, do you agree or disagree that an individual should have a right to have a
registered handgun at home?88
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree
Originalist 2 3 18 76
Nonoriginalist 5 20 37 38
Total 7 10 30 52
In general, do you favor or oppose the following policy concerning gun control:  ban
ownership of a handgun?89
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
Favor Favor Oppose Oppose
Originalist 5 4 15 76
Nonoriginalist 11 18 32 38
Total 10 12 29 50
In general, do you favor or oppose the following policy concerning gun control:  ban
ownership of assault weapons and semiautomatic weapons?90
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
Favor Favor Oppose Oppose
Originalist 23 21 22 34
Nonoriginalist 45 31 15 9
Total 39 24 18 19
In general, do you favor or oppose the following policy concerning gun control:  ban
carrying handguns in public places?91
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
Favor Favor Oppose Oppose
Originalist 16 18 20 46
Nonoriginalist 39 33 14 13
Total 31 26 20 22
In general, do you favor or oppose the following policy concerning gun control:  require
registration and background checks of persons seeking to purchase guns?92
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
Favor Favor Oppose Oppose
Originalist 61 21 4 13
Nonoriginalist 87 11 1 1
Total 76 17 3 4
88. See id., Question 209 (2009), at 22, 58.
89. See id., Question 517_1 (2010), at 33, 102.
90. See id., Question 517_2 (2010), at 33, 102.
91. See id., Question 517_3 (2010), at 33, 102.
92. See id., Question 517_4 (2010), at 33, 103.
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Do you think the words of the Second Amendment were intended to give individual
Americans the right to own a gun or the right of citizens to form a militia?93
Right of Citizens to Form Right of Individual Person to
a Militia Own a Gun
Originalist 7 93
Nonoriginalist 34 66
Total 26 74
Would you approve of the following in your state:  require that all people show that they
can read in order to vote?94
No Yes
Originalist 45 55
Nonoriginalist 41 59
Total 44 56
In general, do you agree or disagree that people should be allowed to say things in
public that might be offensive to racial groups?95
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Originalist 21 19 27 32
Nonoriginalist 24 27 33 16
Total 29 23 28 20
In general, do you agree or disagree that people should be allowed to say things in
public that might be offensive to religious groups?96
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Originalist 15 15 32 37
Nonoriginalist 19 25 36 20
Total 24 21 30 25
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:  Companies
should be allowed to advertise tobacco.97
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree
Originalist 19 26 38 18
Nonoriginalist 22 31 39 9
Total 29 27 33 11
93. See id., Question 519 (2010), at 33, 103.
94. See id., Question VR7a (2009), at 25, 64.
95. See id., Question 210 (2009), at 22, 59.
96. See id., Question 211 (2009), at 22, 59.
97. See id., Question 512a (2010), at 32, 99.
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Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:  People
should be allowed to buy and sell video games depicting extreme violence.98
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree
Originalist 32 22 29 17
Nonoriginalist 20 30 30 20
Total 29 28 28 15
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:  People
should be able to buy and sell videos showing dog fighting, animal torture and killing,
and other types of animal cruelty.99
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree
Originalist 73 15 7 5
Nonoriginalist 64 17 12 7
Total 68 18 9 5
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:  Musicians
should be allowed to sing songs with words that others might find offensive.100
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree
Originalist 20 24 30 27
Nonoriginalist 14 17 34 35
Total 20 19 33 28
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:  People
should be allowed to burn or deface the American flag as a political statement.101
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree
Originalist 63 11 13 12
Nonoriginalist 45 19 24 12
Total 57 15 17 10
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:  Corporations
ought to be able to spend their profits on TV advertisements urging voters to vote for
or against candidates in an upcoming election.102
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree
Originalist 27 24 30 19
Nonoriginalist 30 35 29 6
Total 30 29 31 10
98. See id., Question 512b (2010), at 32, 100.
99. See id., Question 512c (2010), at 32, 100.
100. See id., Question 512d (2010), at 32, 100.
101. See id., Question 512e (2010), at 33, 101.
102. See id., Question 512f (2010), at 33, 101.
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In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  Police should request
identification from anyone that they suspect may be in the country illegally.103
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree
Originalist 7 6 20 66
Nonoriginalist 14 23 30 34
Total 10 17 28 45
In your view should immigration be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?104
Increased Kept at Present Decreased
Originalist 7 30 62
Nonoriginalist 14 36 51
Total 12 34 54
Governments sometimes use the power of eminent domain to acquire a person’s
property at a fair market price for other uses.  Recently, a local government transferred
someone’s property to private developers whose commercial projects could benefit the
local economy.  Do you think the local government should be able to use eminent
domain?105
Yes No
Originalist 6 94
Nonoriginalist 17 83
Total 17 83
Several of these “originalist” positions are not only consistent with
mainstream conservative political views, but also accord with much of the
legal discourse that attends each issue.  Opposition to Roe has long been a
galvanizing motif for originalists,106 the Court’s “evolving standards of de-
cency” approach to capital punishment is a favorite target for Justice
Scalia in his discussions of judicial method,107 and the Second Amend-
ment case for gun rights has long been cast primarily in originalist
terms.108  Up to this point we have merely inquired as to how we know an
103. See id., Question 511c (2010), at 32, 98.
104. See id., Question 217 (2009), at 23, 62.
105. See id., Question 215 (2009), at 23, 61.
106. See Balkin, supra note 56, at 352 (“Roe v. Wade and the right to abortion have R
often been viewed as a controversial symbol of a ‘living constitution’ . . . in the views of its
critics . . . .”).
107. See Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 15, at 40–41 (arguing evolving R
standards of decency approach “is preeminently a common-law way of making law, and not
the way of construing a democratically adopted text” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Melissa Harris, Scalia Defends Judicial Views, Balt. Sun, Apr. 25, 2008, at 3B (noting Justice
Scalia’s view that because, for example, abortion or the death penalty are not covered in
the Constitution, courts should leave such decisions to legislatures).
108. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008) (striking down
District of Columbia’s ban on handguns based on originalist position that Second
Amendment protects individual’s right to possess handgun unconnected with use in
militia); Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J.
Am. Hist. 599, 600 (1982) (“Advocates of both sides [in the Second Amendment debate]
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originalist when we see one, or perhaps more specifically, if we know
someone is an originalist, what else might we suspect about that person?
Our suspicions track conventional wisdom, for the most part.  Originalists
appear more religious, conservative, Republican, morally traditionalist,
and economically libertarian.  They therefore tend to hold the predict-
ably conservative views on the “hot” constitutional controversies of the
day.
III. PREDICTING ORIGINALISM
For the remainder of this Essay, we engage three separate hypotheses
as to the variables that would predict originalist sympathies.  The hypoth-
eses are not inconsistent with each other and in some respect may be
complementary.  Each emphasizes a different approach to the question:
“What factors predict whether someone identifies as an originalist?”  In
other words, unlike in Part II of this Essay, we treat originalism as a de-
pendent variable, instead of looking at it as an independent variable.  We
attempt to explain which factors predict whether someone is an original-
ist, rather than what we might otherwise know about a respondent who
identifies as an originalist.
We proceed in two steps.  First, we flip the axes on the cross-tabula-
tions of the variables we have discussed to this point in Tables 8a, 8b, and
8c.  In each of these tables, we break down groups, once again, into top
and bottom quartiles according to their scores on the originalism index.
Because we have defined originalists and nonoriginalists in this way
(thereby excluding the second and third quartiles of respondents), the
rows in the following tables naturally will not add up to 100%.  We also
present the simple correlations between the variables and the originalism
index (indicated by “r =”).  Finally, we present multivariate regressions
using scores on the originalism index as our dependent variable.
We have been careful to use the language of prediction rather than
causation.  We are hesitant to ask what “causes” someone to be an
originalist or identify the roots of originalist sympathies.  Our data may
point in directions that offer glimpses of answers to those questions.
However, we recognize that we face a problem as to whether an original-
ist ideology is a cause or an effect of the other variables described, or
whether omitted variables may be responsible for variations in both our
independent and dependent variables.  Further research and analysis
might allow us to get closer to answers to those questions.  For present
purposes, we aim simply to verify whether the available evidence is consis-
tent with what we consider the three principal hypotheses about the
predictors of originalist ideology.
Under the first hypothesis, which we call the Legal Hypothesis,
originalism accords with a certain conception of the rule of law.  On this
draw upon the same historical data but interpret them differently in light of their present-
day beliefs.”).
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model, the rule of law is either intrinsically valuable to respondents or is
valuable for reasons we are unable to identify or measure.  We label this
the Legal Hypothesis because it assumes that support for originalism
tracks the justifications most commonly propounded by legal practition-
ers and academics.  That is, a commitment to originalism binds judges to
an agreement actually reached through a legitimate democratic process
and prevents them from deciding cases according to their own concep-
tions of justice, morality, or policy.
We call the second hypothesis the Political Hypothesis, as it posits
that explicitly political considerations predict whether an individual pre-
fers that judges follow the original intentions of the Constitution’s au-
thors.  We can imagine two variations on this hypothesis.  On one ac-
count, one’s views on a set of politically attractive constitutional
outcomes, such as protecting gun rights or upholding abortion bans,
predicts one’s attitudes toward constitutional interpretation.  On a sec-
ond account, originalism is not necessarily associated with specific legal
outcomes but is identified as part of a bundle of substantive commit-
ments tied to the Republican Party or to conservative politics more gener-
ally.  More dramatically, constitutional interpretation could exist as just
one more issue position amenable to heavily contingent electoral and po-
litical forces.  Just as presidents might cause public opinion to shift on
certain issues, such as support for a war or opposition to a government
program, so too might approval of the president be related to the popu-
larity of a mode of constitutional interpretation.
The third hypothesis we call the Cultural Hypothesis.  According to
this model, originalism is itself an expression of deeper cultural commit-
ments, such as attitudes toward family structure, morality, or the role of
government in public life.  An originalist legal methodology, then, ought
to be rooted in cultural issues and the cultural profile of the individual.
As described in our discussion of the profile of originalists, we look specif-
ically at metrics of moral traditionalism, libertarianism, and
egalitarianism.
To reiterate, these hypotheses are not exclusive of each other, and
indeed, we find partial support for each.  Individual predictors for
originalism will vary, but we are interested in assessing the extent to
which our predictive models appear to have traction in the real world.  In
considering each of our models, we first examine cross-tabulations in
which scores on the originalism index are the dependent variable.  We
then present ordinary least squares regressions to assess the relative con-
sistency of the data with the originalism index.
A. The Legal Hypothesis
Among legal academics, justifications for originalism are diverse and
sundry.  Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman describe the Constitution as “an
instruction manual for a form of government,” the commands of which
may be understood only by reference to its immanent intentions:  those
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of a hypothetical reasonable person at the time of the founding.109
Randy Barnett supports originalism because he believes that protection
of natural rights is essential to the Constitution’s legitimacy, and that at-
tention to original meaning is the surest means of ensuring that such
rights are protected.110  John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport argue
that political understandings produced by supermajoritarian rules likely
reflect better policy than those that (evidently) lack similar support.111
The Legal Hypothesis adopts the conservative assumption that these
justifications have not, in most of their relevant particulars, penetrated
into public discourse, and will not meaningfully be reflected in poll re-
sults.  Rather, a different argument is more prominent among popular
commentators:  that originalism is uniquely consistent with the rule of
law.  Judges lack electoral accountability but stand in a principal-agent
relationship with the citizenry at large.  Originalism commits them to a
democratic bargain that prevents them from generating legal rules out of
their own subjective—or worse, partisan—conceptions of fairness or pol-
icy.  As McConnell writes, originalism’s “great appeal” is the fact that the
principles it relies upon to constrain or facilitate modern government
“will be the foundational principles of the American Republic—princi-
ples we can all perceive for ourselves and that have shaped our nation’s
political character—and not the political-moral principles of whomever
happens to occupy the judicial office.”112
It is not difficult to find this rule of law justification in action.  It is a
frequent topic of Justice Scalia’s comments in his public appearances.  As
he told students at Oxford Union:  “You think there ought to be a right to
abortion?  No problem. . . .  Create it the way most rights are created in a
democratic society.  Pass a law.”113  Or as he told students at Stetson Uni-
versity College of Law in 2007:  “If you want to be governed by an aristoc-
racy, there are better aristocracies than nine lawyers.”114  Or as Justice
109. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 Const.
Comment. 47, 53–55 (2006).
110. Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution 4, 67–68 (2004) (“With this
analysis of constitutional legitimacy and natural rights, we will then be in a position to
understand why the words of the Constitution should be interpreted according to their
original meaning . . . .”).
111. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of
Originalism, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 383, 386–87 (2007) (“Supermajority rules . . . permit[ ]
only norms with substantial consensus to be entrenched.  A broad consensus for the
Constitution creates legitimacy, allegiance and even affection as citizens come to regard
the entrenched norms as part of their common bond.”).
112. Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral
Convictions into Law, 98 Yale L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (reviewing Michael J. Perry, Morality,
Politics, and Law (1988)).
113. CBS 60 Minutes, Justice Scalia on the Record, at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2008/04/24/60minutes/main4040290.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last updated Sept. 12, 2008).
114. Chris Tisch, Scalia at Stetson Praises Original Intent View of Constitution, St.
Petersburg Times (Fla.), Apr. 5, 2007, at 3B.
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Thomas told the University of Kansas School of Law in 1996, an “original
understanding” approach to interpretation “deprives modern judges of
the opportunity to write their own preferences into the Constitution by
tethering their analysis to the understanding of those who drafted and
ratified the text” and “places the authority for creating legal rules in the
hands of the people and their representatives rather than in the hands of
the nonelected, unaccountable federal judiciary.”115
Conservative commentators have picked up on just these themes.
Mark Levin writes:  “If the Constitution’s meaning can be erased or re-
written, and the Framers’ intentions ignored, it ceases to be a constitu-
tion but is instead a concoction of political expedients that serve the con-
temporary policy agendas of the few who are entrusted with public
authority to preserve it.”116  Charles Krauthammer has called originalism
“an important counterweight to the irresistible modern impulse to legis-
late from the bench.”117  Rush Limbaugh defines originalism as “not
molding the Constitution to fit your political and social beliefs” and “not
imposing your personal policy whims on society via judicial fiat.”118
The survey data at hand allow us to measure whether specific ideas
about the rule of law are consistent with an affinity for originalism.  Sev-
eral of our questions from the Gibson and Caldeira battery deal directly
with the rule of law issues that appear to animate many originalist argu-
ments, and all at least indirectly engage the same themes.  Most obviously,
the Legal Hypothesis would predict a strong positive correlation between
originalist responses and the views that a judge should “[s]trictly follow
the law no matter what people in the country may want” and should
“[u]phold the values of those who wrote our [C]onstitution two hundred
years ago.”  This Hypothesis would predict a negative correlation between
originalist responses and the view that it is very important for a judge to
“[f]eel empathy for the people involved in a case,” to “[p]rotect people
without power from people and groups with power,” to “[f]ollow his or
her conscience or sense of morality,” or to “[r]espect existing Supreme
Court decisions by changing the law as little as possible.”  If originalism is
most attractive for its disciplinary value, we should expect its proponents
to favor the original intentions of the Framers over the subsequent views
or glosses of judges or transient political majorities.119
115. Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (1996).
116. Mark R. Levin, Liberty and Tyranny:  A Conservative Manifesto 37 (2009).
117. Charles Krauthammer, From Thomas, Original Views, Wash. Post, June 10, 2005,
at A23.
118. Rush Limbaugh, What Is Originalism?, The Limbaugh Letter, Dec. 2005, at 12.
119. For this reason, one might also, on this model, expect a negative correlation
between originalist responses and the view that it is important for judges to “[r]espect the
will of the majority of the people in the U.S.”  The difference between this question and
the “strictly follow the law” question is that the latter situates fidelity to the law as the
alternative to following majority will, whereas the former question leaves the alternative
ambiguous.  If a respondent views the alternative as obedience to the law, the two
questions are very similar.  If, however, a respondent views the alternative as judges
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Table 8a.  Cross-Tabulations:  Judicial Values120
Originalist Nonoriginalist
Strictly follow the law no matter what people in the country may want (r = −0.37)
Very Important 40 11
Somewhat Important 14 29
Not Very Important 6 53
Not Important at All 16 31
Feel empathy for the people involved in a case (r = 0.15)
Very Important 13 22
Somewhat Important 18 27
Not Very Important 25 28
Not Important at All 46 19
Protect people without power from people and groups with power (r = 0.17)
Very Important 17 23
Somewhat Important 25 32
Not Very Important 36 10
Not Important at All 57 23
Respect the will of the majority of people in the United States (r = 0.13)
Very Important 16 21
Somewhat Important 21 30
Not Very Important 26 28
Not Important at All 54 14
Stay entirely independent of the President and Congress (r = −0.22)
Very Important 32 19
Somewhat Important 10 31
Not Very Important 14 45
Not Important at All 23 35
exercising their independent judgment, then we would instead expect “rule of law”
originalists to affirmatively choose the “respect the will of the majority” response.  See
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America:  The Political Seduction of the Law 163 (1990)
(“[T]he attempt to adhere to the principles actually laid down in the historic Constitution
will mean that entire ranges of problems and issues are placed off-limits for judges.”);
Thomas, supra note 115, at 6–7 (“[W]hen interpreting the Constitution, judges should R
seek the original understanding of the provision’s text . . . . [T]he Constitution means not
what the Court says it means, but what the delegates of the Philadelphia and of the state
ratifying conventions understood it to mean.”).  Given this ambiguity, we cannot
confidently predict the “originalist” response to our “respect majority will” question on the
Legal Model.
120. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Questions 102a–102h (2009),
at 20, 51–54.
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Follow his or her conscience or sense of morality (r = 0.18)
Very Important 18 20
Somewhat Important 16 32
Not Very Important 33 23
Not Important at All 59 15
Respect existing Supreme Court decisions by changing the law as little as possible
(r = −0.21)
Very Important 34 12
Somewhat Important 19 30
Not Very Important 16 37
Not Important at All 24 27
Uphold the values of those who wrote our Constitution two hundred years ago
(r = −0.67)
Very Important 41 0
Somewhat Important 2 50
Not Very Important 0 86
Not Important at All 0 82
In order to take a first cut at the extent to which rule of law values
predict the originalist response, we look at a different set of cross-tabula-
tions from those in Table 4.  Table 8a indicates the share of respondents
to each of the eight judicial values questions in the Constitutional Atti-
tudes Survey who score in the top and bottom quartiles of the originalism
index.  We observe that among those who believe it is “very important”
for judges to “strictly follow the law no matter what people in the country
may want,” 40% are originalist, and for those who believe it is “somewhat
important,” only 14% are originalist.121  We see a similar gap with respect
to attitudes toward precedent and judicial independence.  Thirty-four
percent of those who believe it is “very important” to respect existing Su-
preme Court decisions by changing the law as little as possible are
originalists, whereas just 19% of those who believe it is “somewhat impor-
tant” are originalists.  Thirty-two percent of those who consider it “very
important” for judges to stay entirely independent of the President and
Congress are originalists, as compared to 10% of those who just view inde-
pendence as somewhat important.  In contrast, on values such as empathy
or protecting people without power from people and groups with power,
we see, if anything, nonoriginalists comprising a slim majority of those
who think it important for judges to follow those approaches.
121. Sixteen percent of those who think it is not important at all for judges to “strictly
follow the law” are also originalists.  However, the number of people who chose that option
was small—4%, or only 70 people of the 1,677 people surveyed—so the results are not
statistically significant.  As described in Table 2, supra, on most of these judicial values
questions only a small number of people view any of these values as “not important at all.”
Thus, the apparent curvilinear relationship between these variables and the originalism
index is spurious and only due to the tiny share of respondents who think these values are
not important at all.
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These results suggest, albeit with considerable ambiguity, that there
may be something to the Legal Hypothesis.  As the Hypothesis predicts,
those who believe in strict adherence to law notwithstanding the views of
the people seem substantially more likely to be originalists, as do those
who would discount the significance to judicial decisionmaking of empa-
thy or of protecting the weak from the strong.  It is not surprising that
those who value respect for Supreme Court precedent show an affinity
toward originalism, but this affinity is somewhat in tension with the Legal
Hypothesis.  Supporting strict adherence to the original intentions of the
Constitution’s authors is a notoriously poor strategy for ensuring that the
Supreme Court remains faithful to existing precedent.122  However, as
discussed in our multivariate analysis, we might hypothesize that the pre-
dictive power of “respect for precedent” indicates originalists’ preference
for stability and nostalgia for the past.123  In other words, if the roots of
originalist sympathies for some people grow from an aversion to change
and a preference for the way things used to be (a result perhaps more in
keeping with the Cultural Hypothesis than the Legal Hypothesis), then
respecting precedent is in keeping with a general worldview that constitu-
tional meaning should remain bound to an age-old mast.
B. The Political Hypothesis
The Legal Hypothesis comports with the justification that many legal
professionals and commentators have used to describe originalism to
both public and professional audiences.  But it is far from obvious that
the appeal of originalism for many people is conventionally legal.  We can
imagine at least two plausible accounts under which its appeal is primarily
political.  First, it may be that respondents believe that, whether or not
consistent with the rule of law, a judicial commitment to originalism will
lead to desirable political outcomes.  For example, the controversy over
abortion arises so frequently in discussions of originalism because both
sides of the issue generally assume that originalism compels a contrary
outcome in Roe.124  The association of originalism with hostility to Roe
and other liberal decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts was both a
cause for and an effect of the Democratic strategy against the Supreme
Court nomination of Robert Bork in 1987.125  The Reagan Justice Depart-
ment under Attorney General Edwin Meese III simultaneously promoted
122. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 723, 723 (1988) (“The Supreme Court’s repeated invocations of the
Framers’ understanding notwithstanding, a significant portion of our constitutional order
cannot reasonably be reconciled with original understanding.”).
123. See infra Part IV (multivariate analysis).
124. But see Balkin, supra note 56, at 292 (arguing abortion rights are consistent with R
text and underlying principles of Fourteenth Amendment).
125. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal
Appointments Process, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 467, 493–94 & n.83 (1998) (“Judge
Bork’s 1987 confirmation hearings were a watershed event insofar as the Senate’s interest
in preserving Roe v. Wade is concerned.  Prior to the hearings, Roe’s fate was primarily the
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both “a jurisprudence of original intention” and a specific set of constitu-
tional outcomes that they implied such a jurisprudence would produce:  a
rollback of the exclusionary rule; limitations on affirmative action, gay
rights, and immigrant rights; expanded protection for property rights
and executive authority; diminution in congressional power to regulate
state and local governments; and, most prominently, restrictions on abor-
tion rights.126  A political model of this sort would suggest that, quite con-
trary to the basic premise of the Legal Hypothesis, the case for original-
ism is best stated in consequentialist terms.
There is a distinct and less sophisticated way in which the appeal of
originalism could be characterized as political.  It could be that original-
ism is simply one of many notional commitments that form part of either
a Republican or a conservative “package.”  We return to Rush Limbaugh:
There is no greater difference between liberals and conserva-
tives than their views on the Constitution.  Liberals generally be-
lieve in a so-called “living Constitution,” which means whatever
they say it means, whenever they mean it, depending on their
political agenda at the moment.  Conservatives, who hold that
“words mean things,” counter that the Constitution means what
it says, in the plain sense of the original text.127
Limbaugh invokes the themes of the Legal Hypothesis, but just as
importantly he seeks to establish originalism as part of the conservative
brand.  In this sense, originalism is—like low taxes, self-reliance, and sup-
port for the military—a basic commitment that, in part, defines conserva-
tism.  On this view, one who is already conservative or wishes to affiliate
with conservative matters need not conform to the Legal Hypothesis or
any other analytic justification in order to embrace originalism.  Rather,
the set of political commitments she experiences derive in large part
from successful branding by partisan or ideological signalers.128
concern of those responsible for judicial selection in the Reagan administration.” (internal
citation omitted)).
126. See Edwin Meese III, The Supreme Court of the United States:  Bulwark of a
Limited Constitution, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455, 464 (1986) (“A jurisprudence seriously aimed
at the explication of original intention would produce defensible principles of government
that would not be tainted by ideological predilection.”); see also Office of Legal Policy,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report to the Attorney General, The Constitution in the Year 2000:
Choices Ahead in Constitutional Interpretation, at iii (1988) (analyzing fifteen major
constitutional controversies, “the resolution of which [was] likely to be sharply influenced
by the judicial philosophies of the individual justices who sit on the Court,” and predicting
how Constitution would look in year 2000 should issues be decided by a so-called activist
Court).
127. Limbaugh, supra note 118, at 12. R
128. See Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma:  Can
Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? 207 (1998) (“[P]arties work to make their
‘brand names’ effective by linking policy positions and outcomes to the party.”); Michael
Tomz & Paul M. Sniderman, Brand Names and the Organization of Mass Belief Systems 17
(Oct. 10, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“Political parties and elites arrange policies into coherent bundles and attach brand
\\server05\productn\C\COL\111-2\COL204.txt unknown Seq: 38  3-FEB-11 13:37
2011] PROFILING ORIGINALISM 393
Under the first variant of the Political Hypothesis, we would expect
to see particular issue areas that seem to predict originalism.  There are
few issues for which there is consensus even among legal scholars as to
the “correct” originalist position.  We can, however, postulate a political
consensus that an originalist approach to interpretation disfavors abor-
tion rights and gay rights and favors an individual right to carry a hand-
gun for self-defense.  Casual inspection of cross-tabulations that situate
originalism as the dependent variable, as found in Table 8b, indeed sug-
gests that disagreement with Roe, opposition to same-sex marriage, and
support for individual gun rights may predict originalism.  Fifty-five per-
cent of those who strongly disagree with Roe are originalist, as are 35% of
those who oppose same-sex marriage, and 34% of those who strongly
agree that an individual should have a right to have a registered handgun
at home.  Substantial majorities of those who favor allowing school prayer
and who agree that “people should be able to say things in public that
might be offensive to racial groups” are originalist.
The cross-tabulations also suggest that certain other issue positions,
regardless of their connection to originalism as a legal theory, might also
predict originalism.  For example, 35% of those who strongly agree that
“[p]olice should request identification from anyone that they suspect
may be in the country illegally,” and 30% of those who believe the “U.S.
military should be allowed to torture those who may have been involved
with acts of terror” are originalists.  In contrast, substantial majorities of
those who oppose school prayer, the death penalty, and gun rights are
nonoriginalists.
names, giving citizens the information they need to put together a consistent set of
positions across an array of issues.”).
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Table 8b.  Cross-Tabulations:  Issue-Specific Variables
Originalist Nonoriginalist
Do you think the U.S. military should be allowed to torture those who may have been
involved with acts of terror?129 (r = 0.16)
No 19 28
Yes 30 20
Do you favor or oppose affirmative action programs that give preferences to blacks
and other minorities in college admissions?130 (r = 0.29)
Strongly Favor 0 27
Favor 10 35
Oppose 24 27
Strongly Oppose 41 14
Do you think marriages between same-sex couples should or should not be recognized
by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages?131 (r = 0.44)
Yes 5 39
No 35 16
Quite apart from whether you think same-sex marriage should be legal in your state,
do you think that the federal government should recognize same-sex marriages in
states where it is legal?132 (r = 0.42)
Yes 8 36
No 37 16
A recent case challenged a Texas law that banned sexual relations between consenting
adults of the same gender.  Would you support a state law banning sex between
people of the same gender?133 (r = 0.28)
No 18 32
Yes 35 10
In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  Gays and lesbians
should be able to serve openly in the military?134 (r = 0.45)
Strongly Agree 8 36
Agree Somewhat 20 27
Disagree Somewhat 32 16
Strongly Disagree 54 6
Should the government be allowed to apply the death penalty to an adult convicted of
murder?135 (r = 0.15)
No 16 36
Yes 25 22
129. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Question 202 (2009), at 21,
54.
130. See id., Question 203 (2009), at 21, 55.
131. See id., Question 204 (2009), at 21, 55.
132. See id., Question 205 (2009), at 21, 55.
133. See id., Question 206 (2009), at 21–22, 56.
134. See id., Question 511b (2010), at 32, 98.
135. See id., Question 207a (2009), at 22, 56.
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In general, do you believe that public schools should be permitted to start each school
day with a prayer?136 (r = 0.33)
No 9 39
Yes 30 19
In general, do you agree or disagree that an individual should have a right to have a
registered handgun at home?137 (r = 0.26)
Strongly Disagree 7 19
Disagree Somewhat 6 42
Agree Somewhat 14 31
Strongly Agree 34 18
In general, do you favor or oppose the following policy concerning gun control:  ban
ownership of a handgun?138 (r = 0.27)
Strongly Favor 13 31
Somewhat Favor 8 41
Somewhat Oppose 12 28
Strongly Oppose 35 19
In general, do you favor or oppose the following policy concerning gun control:  ban
ownership of assault weapons and semiautomatic weapons?139 (r = 0.28)
Strongly Favor 14 29
Somewhat Favor 21 34
Somewhat Oppose 29 21
Strongly Oppose 39 12
In general, do you favor or oppose the following policy concerning gun control:  ban
carrying handguns in public places?140 (r = 0.33)
Strongly Favor 12 32
Somewhat Favor 16 32
Somewhat Oppose 22 18
Strongly Oppose 47 15
In general, do you favor or oppose the following policy concerning gun control:
require registration and background checks of persons seeking to purchase guns?141
(r = 0.28)
Strongly Favor 19 29
Somewhat Favor 30 17
Somewhat Oppose 31 9
Strongly Oppose 69 3
136. See id., Question 208 (2009), at 22, 58.
137. See id., Question 209 (2009), at 22, 58.
138. See id., Question 517_1 (2010), at 33, 102.
139. See id., Question 517_2 (2010), at 33, 102.
140. See id., Question 517_3 (2010), at 33, 102.
141. See id., Question 517_4 (2010), at 33, 103.
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Do you think the words of the Second Amendment were intended to give individual
Americans the right to keep and bear arms for their own defense or were these words
intended to protect the right of citizens to form a militia?142 (r = 0.26)
Right of Citizens to 6 34Form a Militia
Right of Individual 29 22Person to Own a Gun
In general, do you agree or disagree with the 1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme Court
decision that established a woman’s right to an abortion?143 (r = 0.46)
Strongly Agree 7 39
Agree Somewhat 16 21
Disagree Somewhat 35 24
Strongly Disagree 55 6
Do you approve of the following in your state:  require that all people show that they
can read in order to vote?144 (r = 0.01)
No 24 24
Yes 23 26
In general, do you agree or disagree that people should be allowed to say things in
public that might be offensive to racial groups?145 (r = 0.09)
Strongly Disagree 19 23
Mildly Disagree 20 29
Mildly Agree 21 28
Strongly Agree 37 20
In general, do you agree or disagree that people should be allowed to say things in
public that might be offensive to religious groups?146 (r = 0.11)
Strongly Disagree 16 22
Mildly Disagree 17 30
Mildly Agree 23 28
Strongly Agree 35 21
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:  Companies
should be allowed to advertise tobacco.147 (r = 0.10)
Strongly Disagree 15 19
Disagree Somewhat 22 29
Agree Somewhat 27 30
Strongly Agree 37 20
142. See id., Question 519 (2010), at 33, 103.
143. See id., Question 212 (2009), at 22–23, 59.
144. See id., Question VR7a (2009), at 25, 64.
145. See id., Question 210 (2009), at 22, 58.
146. See id., Question 211 (2009), at 22, 59.
147. See id., Question 512a (2010), at 32, 99.
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Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:  People
should be allowed to buy and sell video games depicting extreme violence.148
(r = −0.06)
Strongly Disagree 26 17
Disagree Somewhat 18 27
Agree Somewhat 24 28
Strongly Agree 26 33
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:  People
should be able to buy and sell videos showing dog fighting, animal torture and killing,
and other types of animal cruelty.149 (r = −0.05)
Strongly Disagree 25 23
Disagree Somewhat 21 24
Agree Somewhat 18 33
Strongly Agree 21 34
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:  Musicians
should be allowed to sing songs with words that others might find offensive.150
(r = −0.11)
Strongly Disagree 23 18
Disagree Somewhat 28 22
Agree Somewhat 22 27
Strongly Agree 22 31
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:  People
should be allowed to burn or deface the American flag as a political statement.151
(r = −0.11)
Strongly Disagree 26 20
Disagree Somewhat 18 33
Agree Somewhat 19 36
Strongly Agree 27 28
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:
Corporations ought to be able to spend their profits on TV advertisements urging
voters to vote for or against candidates in an upcoming election.152 (r = 0.14)
Strongly Disagree 21 25
Disagree Somewhat 19 30
Agree Somewhat 23 24
Strongly Agree 44 14
148. See id., Question 512b (2010), at 32, 100.
149. See id., Question 512c (2010), at 32, 100.
150. See id., Question 512d (2010), at 32, 100.
151. See id., Question 512e (2010), at 33, 101.
152. See id., Question 512f (2010), at 33, 101.
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Do you agree or disagree with the following:  Police should request identification
from anyone that they suspect might be in the country illegally?153 (r = 0.23)
Strongly Disagree 16 33
Mildly Disagree 9 33
Mildly Agree 17 27
Strongly Agree 35 19
Should noncitizens suspected of terrorism and detained in U.S. military prisons be
allowed to challenge their detentions in the U.S. civilian court system?154 (r = 0.27)
Yes 12 34
No 31 19
Governments sometimes use the power of eminent domain to acquire a person’s
property at a fair market price for other uses.  Recently, a local government
transferred someone’s property to private developers whose commercial projects
could benefit the local economy.  Do you think the local government should be able
to use eminent domain for this purpose or not?155 (r = 0.13)
Yes 10 29
No 26 25
In your view, do you think immigration should be kept at its present level, increased,
or decreased?156 (r = 0.13)
Increased 15 29
Kept at Present Level 21 26
Decreased 27 23
The most direct evidence in support of this second variant on the
Political Hypothesis is, quite naturally, whether either conservative ideol-
ogy or Republicanism predicts originalism.  Indeed, as shown in Table 8c,
among those who identify as “strong Republicans,” 59% are originalists,
and among those who identify as “extremely conservative,” 78% are
originalists.157  Given the strong relationship between party and presiden-
tial and congressional approval, we find a similar dynamic with those
questions, as depicted in Table 8d.  Those who disapprove of the job Pres-
ident Obama and the 111th Congress are doing are more likely also to
identify as originalists.  Standing alone, these numbers suggest that, con-
sistent with the second version of the Political Hypothesis, originalism
may be part of a Republican or conservative brand, and originalist atti-
tudes correlate well with other planks on the Republican Party’s platform.
153. See id., Question 511c (2010), at 32, 98.
154. See id., Question 214 (2009), at 23, 61.
155. See id., Question 215 (2009), at 23, 61.
156. See id., Question 217 (2009), at 23, 62.
157. Originalists comprise 78% of those who identify as “extremely conservative,” but
the sample includes only 40 people in 2010 so identifying.
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Table 8c.  Partisanship and Ideology as Predictors of Originalism158
Originalist Nonoriginalist
Party Identification (r = 0.48)
Strong Democrat 4 29
Not Strong Democrat 6 42
Leans Democrat 7 37
Leans Republican 46 10
Not Strong Republican 28 19
Strong Republican 59 9
Ideology (r = 0.50)
Extremely Liberal 2 34
Liberal 5 35
Slightly Liberal 7 36
Moderate 11 31
Slightly Conservative 29 17
Conservative 58 8
Extremely Conservative 78 2
Table 8d.  Presidential and Congressional Approval as
Predictors of Originalism
Originalist Nonoriginalist
Obama Approval (2010)159 (r = 0.54)
Strongly Approve 8 38
Approve Somewhat 6 38
Disapprove Somewhat 21 16
Strongly Disapprove 59 7
Congress Approval (2010)160 (r = 0.37)
Strongly Approve 24 20
Approve Somewhat 9 32
Disapprove Somewhat 14 30
Strongly Disapprove 53 9
Given the importance of originalist rhetoric for the Tea Party move-
ment, we also wanted to gauge whether support for the Tea Party helped
predict originalist leanings according to the CAS.  Thirty-nine percent of
Tea Party supporters score in the top quartile of originalists, and 33% of
Tea Party opponents score in the bottom quartile.  The correlation (r =
158. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Questions 7–11 (2010), at
36–37, 109–10.
159. See id., Question 500 (2010), at 31, 94.
160. See id., Question 600 (2010), at 35–36, 107.
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0.38) is stronger than it is for most issue variables but not as strong as the
other partisan variables.
Table 8e.  Tea Party Support as Predictor of Originalism161
Originalist Nonoriginalist
Support Tea Party Movement (2010) (r = 0.38)
Oppose Tea Party Movement 9 33
Support Tea Party Movement 39 17
C. The Cultural Hypothesis
Digress for a moment and recall the famous singing of La Marseillaise
at Rick’s Cafe´ in the film Casablanca.162  The patrons join in not because
(or not just because) it is more melodic than Die Wacht am Rhein, not
because it will in fact drive the Germans out of Casablanca, and not be-
cause (or not just because) the anthem is French or even in French.
Rather, they sing because La Marseillaise is the battle hymn of the French
Revolution during a period of fascist occupation.  They sing because they
wish to evoke the revolutionary ideals of liberte´, egalite´, and fraternite´.
The anthem is valuable less for what it promises than for what it expresses.
This is how we might understand originalism through the Cultural
Hypothesis.  The second variation on the Political Hypothesis expresses
identity in a thin sense.  The respondent sensitive to this Hypothesis in
effect delegates her methodological choice to political signalers.  It is not
necessary that she engage with or critically assess the methodology itself.
The Cultural Hypothesis also expresses identity, but in a thicker way.
Under this hypothesis, irrespective of its particulars as a modality of legal
analysis or the political results it might produce in actual cases, original-
ism is selected because it resonates with a set of cultural values that the
respondent finds compelling.  Affiliation with originalism may also signal
solidarity with others who share the same set of values.  In a pioneering
book, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky described what they called “a
cultural theory of risk perception.”163  The idea was that our perception
of environmental risks varies based on our cultural orientation, be it indi-
vidualistic, solidaristic, egalitarian, or hierarchical.164  Dan Kahan and
Donald Braman have applied cultural theory to perceptions of the risks
of gun violence, arguing that cultural variables are so powerfully predic-
tive of attitudes toward guns and gun control that culture overwhelms
empirical arguments in shaping individual attitudes.165  Consumers of
161. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Question 519a (2010), at 33,
103.
162. Casablanca (Warner Bros. 1942).
163. Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture 7 (1982).
164. Id. at 2–15.
165. Kahan & Braman, supra note 17, at 1315–18. R
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constitutional methodology encounter a different, more abstract set of
dangers:  the competing risks that judges will underprotect rights, will
yield too much power to national as against local officials (or vice versa),
or will overzealously remove authority from more democratically respon-
sive actors and institutions.  We expect individuals to appreciate these
risks differently depending on their cultural world views, and to affiliate
with constitutional methodologies that resonate with those culturally in-
fluenced risk perceptions.
On the Cultural Hypothesis, we expect moral traditionalists to be
originalists.  Originalism expresses an affinity for traditional values and a
suspicion of changes in political or cultural mores.166  The extent to
which originalism is affiliated with cultural values favoring big or small
government is less obvious, but we can confidently predict that those who
favor small government are more likely to be originalists.  The federal
government contemplated by the Constitution’s authors was far smaller
than the one that exists today, and adopting an originalist position is an
appropriate strategy for those who wish the Supreme Court to police the
expansion of the federal administrative and regulatory state.167  Moreo-
ver, the Court is itself part of that federal regulatory state, and the central
appeal of originalism is its presumed capacity to reduce the discretion of
modern Justices by tethering their decisionmaking to an older, smaller
world.  More generally, the Founders’ Constitution might evoke, for
many, any number of distinct themes—the western frontier, states’ rights
and local control, Madisonian civic republicanism—that comfortably in-
habit a small-government aesthetic.  Finally, we have a weak expectation
that originalists will be more satisfied than nonoriginalists with the na-
tion’s level of equality.  The founding generation tolerated, and indeed
accommodated within the Constitution, a radically unequal social or-
der.168  Constitutional claims that rely on that generation’s political au-
thority seem less likely to resonate with those who are uncomfortable with
166. See Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 69–71
(2009) [hereinafter Greene, Origins] (explaining how originalism’s focus on traditional
values and emphasis on original meaning often excludes alternative constitutional
interpretations that would extend constitutional protections to traditionally unprotected
groups).
167. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 596–99 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing “substantial effects” test of federal power under Commerce Clause is
inconsistent with original understanding and was invention of New Deal Court); see also
Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State?  Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of
Retrenchment 35 (1994) (arguing centralization of regulatory authority permits uniform
fiscal policy and therefore makes it more difficult for businesses and individuals to respond
to local taxes by relocating).
168. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (counting individual slaves as three-fifths of a
person for purposes of apportioning representatives and direct taxes among states); id. art.
IV, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring escaped slaves to be returned to owners after flight into another
state).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\111-2\COL204.txt unknown Seq: 47  3-FEB-11 13:37
402 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 111:356
the present level of equality in society.  Again, however, we regard this as
a fairly weak expectation.169
Our cross-tabulations in Tables 9a, 9b, and 9c are consistent with the
expected difference in values relating to moral traditionalism, libertarian-
ism, and egalitarianism between originalists and nonoriginalists.  Thus,
64% of respondents who strongly disagree that “[t]he world is always
changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those
changes” and 58% of respondents who strongly disagree that “[w]e
should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their
own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own” are
originalists.  Of course, perhaps these relationships could be explained by
the large share of originalists among evangelicals, frequent churchgoers,
and those who believe in the literal truth of the Bible, or they might be
explained by the fact that older respondents tend to be more originalist
than younger ones—as noted in Table 9d.  Additionally, in our paired
statements designed to assess relative levels of libertarianism, about one-
third of those who selected the anti-big government option in each pair
are originalists.  The relationships appear even stronger for the egalitari-
anism battery.  We find, for example, that 64% of those who strongly disa-
gree—and 46% of those who disagree somewhat—that “[o]ur society
should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal
opportunity to succeed” are originalists.  Forty-four percent of those who
strongly agree “[w]e have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this
country” are originalists, as are 46% of those who strongly agree that “[i]t
is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in
life than others.”  Similar relationships appear to hold for the other items
on the egalitarianism battery.
169. One reason this is a weak expectation is that our egalitarianism battery does not
specify any particular domain of equality.  We might hypothesize that those who believe
racial minorities receive less opportunity in society are less likely to be originalist, but we
might also assume that those who believe social life is unduly dominated by corporations
or by the federal government are more likely to be originalist.  Either of these groups
might plausibly be coded as being uncomfortable with the present level of inequality in
society.
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Table 9a.  Cross Tabulations:  Moral Traditionalism170
Originalist Nonoriginalist
The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to
those changes. (r = 0.53)
Strongly Agree 7 34
Agree Somewhat 6 39
Disagree Somewhat 18 19
Strongly Disagree 64 6
The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society. (r = −0.39)
Strongly Agree 46 11
Agree Somewhat 19 24
Disagree Somewhat 8 41
Strongly Disagree 8 41
We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own
moral standards, even if they are very different from our own. (r = 0.39)
Strongly Agree 9 39
Agree Somewhat 14 29
Disagree Somewhat 36 17
Strongly Disagree 58 10
This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on
traditional family ties. (r = −0.41)
Strongly Agree 39 11
Agree Somewhat 19 28
Disagree Somewhat 3 43
Strongly Disagree 7 46
170. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Questions 4a–4d (2009), at
29, 74–75.
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Table 9b.  Cross Tabulations:  Libertarianism171
Originalist Nonoriginalist
Pair A:  (r = 0.37)
Government has become bigger because 7 35the problems we face have become bigger.
The main reason government has become
bigger over the years is because it has got- 35 19ten involved in things that people should
do for themselves.
Pair B:  (r = 0.42)
We need a strong government to handle 8 32today’s complex economic problems.
The free market can handle these
problems without government being 44 15
involved.
Pair C:  (r = 0.40)
There are more things that government 7 34should be doing.
The less government the better. 39 17
171. See id., Question 6, Pair A–C (2009), at 29–30, 75–76.
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Table 9c.  Cross Tabulations:  Egalitarianism172
Originalist Nonoriginalist
Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal
opportunity to succeed. (r = 0.23)
Strongly Agree 17 24
Agree Somewhat 19 30
Disagree Somewhat 46 18
Strongly Disagree 64 16
We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. (r = −0.34)
Strongly Agree 44 11
Agree Somewhat 29 22
Disagree Somewhat 9 33
Strongly Disagree 9 40
One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal
chance. (r = 0.30)
Strongly Agree 14 24
Agree Somewhat 9 32
Disagree Somewhat 26 26
Strongly Disagree 55 12
This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.
(r = −0.33)
Strongly Agree 47 6
Agree Somewhat 27 25
Disagree Somewhat 13 33
Strongly Disagree 8 32
It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than
others. (r = −0.25)
Strongly Agree 46 14
Agree Somewhat 28 23
Disagree Somewhat 22 27
Strongly Disagree 10 30
If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer
problems. (r = 0.27)
Strongly Agree 14 24
Agree Somewhat 13 30
Disagree Somewhat 35 25
Strongly Disagree 45 13
172. See id., Questions 3a–3f (2009), at 29, 72–74.
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Table 9d.  Cross Tabulations:  Demographic Variables
Originalist Nonoriginalist
Race173 (r = −0.13)
White 29 23
Black 4 37
Hispanic 32 25
Other, Non-Hispanic 7 26
2+ Races, Non-Hispanic 14 17
Gender174 (r = −0.06)
Male 27 25
Female 20 26
Age175 (r = 0.16)
18–24 14 34
25–34 11 35
34–44 27 25
45–54 21 23
55–64 31 18
65–74 30 19
75+ 35 17
Education176 (r = 0.02)
Less than High School 10 18
High School 21 19
Some College 27 25
Bachelor’s or Higher 29 35
Metro177 (r = 0.09)
Metro 22 27
Non-Metro 28 17
Region178 (r = 0.02)
Northeast 23 35
Midwest 24 20
South 26 25
West 18 23
173. See id., Background Demographic Variables (2010), at 87.
174. See id. at 88.
175. See id. at 86.
176. See id. at 87.
177. See id. at 89.
178. See id. at 90.
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Income179 (r = 0.04)
$0–$24,999 21 23
$25,000–$49,999 21 24
$50,000–$74,999 24 22
$75,000–$99,999 25 33
$100,000–$124,999 24 26
$125,000–$149,999 38 25
$150,000–$174,999 26 25
$175,000+ 30 29
Literal Truth of the Bible180 (r = 0.30)
Do Not Believe in Literal Truth 14 39
Believe in Literal Truth 30 15
Religious Service Attendance181 (r = −0.32)
More Than 1x/Week 46 8
1x/Week 36 17
1x–2x/Month 15 30
Few Times/Year 19 29
1x/Year or Less 19 30
Never 10 33
Evangelicalism182 (r = 0.31)
Not Born-Again/Evangelical Christian 16 30
Born-Again/Evangelical Christian 38 14
IV. ANALYSIS
We use multiple regression analysis to evaluate the extent to which
our data are consistent with each of our hypotheses.  We present ordinary
least squares regressions with the originalism index as our dependent va-
riable, derived from all the originalism questions in the 2009 and 2010
CAS.  This analysis enables us to assess the magnitude of the effect of a
change in our explanatory variables on our dependent variable, original-
ism, while holding other explanatory variables constant.  We present the
regression in Table 10.
179. See id.
180. See id., Question 5 (2009), at 18, 49.
181. See id., Question 27 (2009), at 16, 79.
182. See id., Question 26a (2010), at 36, 108.
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Table 10.  Predicting Originalism183
I II III IV V
Age 0.07*** 0.04* 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education 0.04* 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Literal Truth of Bible 0.41*** 0.19* 0.21** 0.24*** 0.18**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Political Party 0.17*** 0.06* 0.03 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Conservatism 0.17*** 0.06* 0.03 0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Tea Party Support 0.19* 0.16* 0.08 0.07
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Moral Traditionalism 0.28*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.13**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Libertarianism 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.11** 0.10*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Gay Rights Index 0.09* 0.09* 0.08
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Gun Rights Index 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.17***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Oppose Roe v. Wade 0.09* 0.08* 0.09**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Allow Religious/Racially 0.10** 0.07* 0.08*
Offensive Speech (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Obama Disapproval 0.14** 0.13**
(0.05) (0.05)
Congress Disapproval 0.15*** 0.14**
(0.05) (0.04)
Strictly Follow Law 0.17***
(0.05)
Respect Precedent 0.10**
(0.03)
Constant −0.82*** −0.58* −0.75*** −1.23*** −0.62*
(0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.28)
N 918 845 826 800 799
R Squared 0.34 0.44 0.54 0.54 0.56
As Table 10 indicates, the model has a little something for each hy-
pothesis.  Belief in the rule of law, certain cultural values, and political
attitudes help predict whether someone is an originalist.  Once other ide-
ological and issue-specific variables are added (that is, the types of vari-
ables that most bear on these hypotheses we are testing), the only demo-
graphic variable that remains statistically significant is age.  Gender, race,
frequency of church attendance, and born-again status (not depicted
183. Cell entries denote unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in
parentheses.  * p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
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here) are not statistically significant, but belief in the literal truth of the
Bible is.
Advocates of the Legal Hypothesis can find support in the signifi-
cance of two variables from the Gibson and Caldeira battery.  Those who
agree that good judges should “[s]trictly follow the law no matter what
people in the country may want” and “[r]espect existing Supreme Court
decisions by changing the law as little as possible” are likely to score high
on the originalism index.  None of the other judicial variables—even the
question relating to empathy—are significant when included in the re-
gression.184  As discussed earlier, there is some sense in the notion that
those who wish the Court to respect its existing precedent by changing
the law very little would also support originalism.  But the likely reason
for a positive correlation between these values is that both disfavor chang-
ing the law to accommodate current political majorities.
The data provide a great deal of support for the Cultural Hypothesis.
Both the moral traditionalism and libertarianism indexes represent pow-
erful statistically significant predictors of originalism.  Even if we employ
individual items from these indexes instead of the indexes themselves, we
achieve very similar results.  The same cannot be said with respect to the
egalitarianism index.  Fears of big government, plus nostalgia for tradi-
tional values, go a long way toward predicting originalist sympathies.  In
fact, the correlation between the originalism index and the moral tradi-
tionalism and libertarianism indexes are 0.57 and 0.47 respectively.  Cor-
relation between the originalism and the egalitarianism indexes hovers
around 0.30.
The Political Hypothesis accounts for the remaining variables in the
regression.  Republican Party identification and self-placement on a lib-
eral to conservative scale remains statistically significant until we add in
attitudes on specific issues.  Tea Party support remains significant even
when party, ideology and values indexes are included in the regression,
but not once Obama and recent congressional disapproval is added (sug-
gesting, perhaps, that support for the Tea Party is really about unfavora-
ble views toward Obama).  Obama disapproval is strongly correlated (r =
0.54) and recent congressional disapproval somewhat less so (r = 0.37)
with the originalism index.  Given that the addition of these variables also
reduces the size of the coefficient on the libertarianism index, such mea-
sures may also account, in part, for respondents’ general fear of big gov-
ernment.  At the same time, the significance of those disapproval vari-
ables attests to what might be the political contingency of originalism for
some respondents.  In other words, for some respondents, affection for
originalism may grow during times when they fear a “change agenda” like
the one promoted by President Obama and the Democrats in the 111th
184. Neither of the significant variables is so highly correlated with our dependent
variable so as to raise concerns, as one might reasonably suspect.  Furthermore, the
addition of these variables, as the stepwise regression indicates, only changes the r squared
by 0.03 and all the other variables in the model remain significant.
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Congress.  Originalism becomes more attractive for some as they view
politics as departing from some pure vision of how the Constitution
should constrain government.
The issues that serve as statistically significant predictors of original-
ism add further support to both the Cultural and Political Hypotheses.
Specific issues that prove significant include a standard menu of salient
constitutional positions associated with the modern Republican Party:
opposition to gay rights and to Roe, and support for gun rights.  Those
variables’ simple correlations with our dependent variable are 0.49, 0.47,
and 0.40, respectively.  Attitudes toward gun rights appear especially sig-
nificant (t value of 4.9 in the full regression:  higher than any other varia-
ble).  However, the gun rights index’s relatively greater significance may
be due in part to the fact that some of the “power” of the abortion and
gay rights variables, acting alone, is accounted for by the moral tradition-
alism index.  Still, the fact that attitudes toward gun rights remain a sig-
nificant predictor of originalism, even when controlling for moral tradi-
tionalism, libertarianism, and a host of other political variables, may attest
to the salience of gun rights in framing current debates over modes of
constitutional interpretation.  In addition, a belief that racially and relig-
iously offensive speech should be allowed is a consistently significant vari-
able in the regressions.  This issue stands at the intersection of moral
traditionalism and libertarianism, given that proponents may view such a
right as especially important to counter liberal notions of political cor-
rectness.  Other speech related items, such as flag burning, campaign fi-
nance, or indecent speech (not presented here), do not show up as sig-
nificant.  Opinion on some other issues, such as torture, detention,
eminent domain, literacy tests for voting, and immigration are significant
in some regressions (not presented here), but none of those variables
display the consistency of abortion, gay rights, gun rights, and racially or
religiously offensive speech.
V. IMPLICATIONS
There is a concern in a study of this sort, already discussed, that any
effort to make sense of the preferences of the public about a legal
method such as originalism cannot produce reliable results.  There are
countless reasons to expect incoherence among the public.  This is true
not only because one’s degree of support for originalism or nonoriginal-
ism might vary.  The more significant problem is that originalism is not
itself a single theory.  As Mitchell Berman has ably demonstrated, there is
no way to define originalism consistently across human experience or
across time and place.185  Unlike survey questions about, say, voting pref-
185. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2009)
(“Originalism comes in many flavors; varied distinct theses are fairly described as
‘originalist’ in tighter or looser senses.”); see also Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living
Originalism, 59 Duke L.J. 239, 244 (2009) (arguing originalism is “not a single, coherent,
unified theory of constitutional interpretation, but rather a smorgasbord of distinct
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erences or intentions, it is not possible to pose a question about original-
ism that all respondents identically appreciate.  And, it may indeed be the
case that originalism is not a meaningful idea to the typical American.
Under the circumstances, it is remarkable that we are able to account for
half the variation in response to our originalism index with an identifi-
able set of explanatory variables.186
We do not wish to overburden our data with our own conclusions as
to its potential prescriptive or normative implications.  Our aim has not
been to explain or to justify originalism but rather to profile and dissect it
and to provide a resource for those who are interested in its salience and
proliferation.187  That said, a few observations about our results are in
order.  First, as noted above, the significant explanatory variables by and
large conform to what we would expect of respondents who are engaging
the questions in a serious and relatively informed manner.  The data are
consistent to varying but nontrivial degrees with each of the proposed
hypotheses.  These preferences surely reflect the promise of originalism,
whether or not originalism is able to deliver.  Our data suggest a rough
divide between those who believe in the capacity and the desirability of a
prominent interpretivist method to enforce strict adherence to law, to
concretize the values of past generations, to limit the growth of govern-
ment, and to avoid a decision like Roe.  This dichotomy is not haphazard,
nor is it simply a partisan divide between Democrats and Republicans.
Rather, it parallels the divide within professional constitutional discourse
among lawyers, judges, and academic commentators.188
constitutional theories that share little in common except a misleading reliance on a single
label”).
186. See supra Part IV (describing multivariate analysis).
187. For efforts at the former, see generally Greene, Origins, supra note 166 (arguing R
that originalist arguments in the United States emerge from, among other things, a
particular reverence for the founding era, a backlash against the Warren Court, and a
relative preference for political assimilation); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a
Political Practice:  The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 545, 549, 569
(2006) (arguing jurisprudence of originalism is distinct from its political practice, which
“seeks . . . to forge a vibrant connection between the Constitution and contemporary
conservative values,” and therefore should be the focus of scholars who seek to understand
how originalism has “rewrit[ten] the face of the Constitution”).
188. In regressions not presented here, we have divided up our sample between more
and less knowledgeable respondents, as gauged by their correct answers to twelve questions
concerning the Supreme Court and its recent decisions.  Our model does a better job of
explaining the variance for the more knowledgeable respondents (r squared = 0.65) than
for less knowledgeable respondents (r squared = 0.50).  For the more knowledgeable
respondents, moral traditionalism, libertarianism, gun rights, religious/racially offensive
speech, strict adherence to law, respect for precedent, and Obama approval are statistically
significant variables.  For less knowledgeable respondents, age, literal truth of the Bible,
Roe, gay rights, gun rights, strict adherence to law, respect for precedent, and recent
congressional approval are statistically significant variables.  We might be able to spin a
story from such results along the lines that culture and values are more important for the
knowledgeable respondents, whereas issues are more important for the less knowledgeable
respondents.  Most would have expected the reverse to be true.  We believe further
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Second, and related, we are impressed by the strength of the Cul-
tural Hypothesis.  Our data give us substantial confidence that moral tra-
ditionalists and economic libertarians are disproportionately more likely
to select originalism than others.189  These groups are not obvious philo-
sophical allies, but, as has been well documented, their courtship—or “fu-
sion”—was pushed aggressively by conservative intellectuals like Frank
Meyer and William F. Buckley in the 1950s and 1960s, and was consum-
mated by the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980.190
The basic intellectual move is the suggestion that a liberal commitment
to economic freedom must be disciplined by abiding by moral commit-
ments.191  We do not assume that this justification itself unites neoliberals
and social conservatives behind originalism, but it is noteworthy that this
pairing mimics not only the periodically successful Republican political
coalitions of the last generation—as well as the Tea Party movement of
the current age—but also plays out in professional discourse.  The dual
targets of the originalism movement of the last three decades have been
the expanding regulatory state and the proliferation of rights grounded
in sexual privacy.192  Historians of the conservative legal movement who
research is needed to better evaluate the interaction of knowledge with these variables on
attitudes toward originalism.
189. See supra Tables 6d & 6e (profiling data on originalists with respect to moral
traditionalism and libertarianism).
190. See, e.g., John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation:
Conservative Power in America 51 (2004) (“Buckley tried to fashion a synthesis out of
three fractious components of 1950s conservatism:  traditionalism, libertarianism and
anticommunism.”); Kevin J. Smant, Principles and Heresies:  Frank S. Meyer and the
Shaping of the American Conservative Movement 49–52 (2002) (describing Meyer’s efforts
to “fuse” morally traditionalist and libertarian worldviews into a coherent philosophy).
191. Some of the fruits of the fusion of moral traditionalism and anti-government
libertarianism are on display in the “Mount Vernon Statement” signed by many prominent
conservatives in February 2010.  The Mount Vernon Statement, Constitutional
Conservatism:  A Statement for the 21st Century (2010), available at http://www.themount
vernonstatement.com (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  The statement begins, “We
recommit ourselves to the ideas of the American Founding.”  Id.  It then seeks to reconcile
any apparent tension between economic libertarians, social conservatives, and national
security hawks:
A Constitutional conservatism unites all conservatives through the natural fusion
provided by American principles.  It reminds economic conservatives that
morality is essential to limited government, social conservatives that unlimited
government is a threat to moral self-government, and national security
conservatives that energetic but responsible government is the key to America’s
safety and leadership role in the world.
Id.
192. Arguably the most prominent academic originalists are the libertarian Randy
Barnett and the moral traditionalist Justice Scalia.  They are the bookends of originalism in
the legal academy and their differences were prominently on display in Gonzales v. Raich, in
which Barnett argued for the respondent that Congress lacked the power to ban medical
marijuana use by local growers whose conduct was legal under California law.  545 U.S. 1,
15 (2005) (“[R]espondents[ ] . . . argue that the [statute’s] categorical prohibition of the
manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and
possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’
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wish to understand why originalism has been so integral to it will see
value in the fact that it appeals independently to the two groups whose
union has been so vital to conservative politics more generally.
Third, the relative strength of the Cultural Hypothesis might carry
implications for the robust normative legal debate over originalist meth-
ods and over the “correct” originalist answer to specific legal controver-
sies.  Cultural cognition scholars such as Kahan and Braman have sug-
gested that policy beliefs shaped by varying assessments of risk are more
typically products of cultural values rather than empirical proof.193  They
argue that beliefs shaped by such values strongly resist, and indeed co-
opt, empirically based counterarguments.194  If Americans support
originalism not just because it has an inherent disciplinary value for
judges but also because they have a prior cultural predisposition that
leads them to prefer a methodology that appeals to self-reliance and
moral traditionalism, we might reasonably wonder whether originalism is
capable of being proven right or wrong.  Moreover, if the same cultural
predisposition that predicts originalism also predicts the substantive re-
sults associated with originalism—such as opposition to Roe—then a kind
of cognitive dissonance may hinder efforts to sever the link between
methodology and result.  Scholars like Jack Balkin who have tried to ad-
vance an originalist argument for abortion rights may be fruitlessly in-
serting a legal argument into the culture wars.195
Finally, we add a word or two about the relatively recent turn of
many constitutional theorists to forms of popular constitutionalism.
These scholars have sought ways to characterize constitutional evolution
in terms of democratic culture rather than judicial decree.  This move
responds broadly to the countermajoritarian difficulty famously articu-
lated by Alexander Bickel,196 but more specifically seeks to kneecap
originalist arguments that claim a democratic imprimatur.197  It is not just
authority under the Commerce Clause.”).  Justice Scalia voted against Barnett’s client,
effectively in favor of moral paternalism over libertarianism.  See id. at 39 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“In the [statute], Congress has undertaken to extinguish the interstate
market in Schedule I controlled substances, including marijuana.  The Commerce Clause
unquestionably permits this.”); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity:  A Critique of “Faint-
Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 7, 14–15 (2006) (arguing Justice Scalia’s vote to
uphold ban on medical marijuana based on Necessary and Proper Clause revealed his
“lack of fidelity to originalism”).
193. Kahan & Braman, supra note 17, at 1315–18. R
194. Id. at 1316.
195. See Balkin, supra note 56, at 292 (arguing originalism, properly understood, R
supports constitutional protection for abortion rights).
196. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1986)
(introducing concept of countermajoritarian difficulty created by judicial review).
197. See Nathaniel Persily, Introduction, in Public Opinion and Constitutional
Controversy 3, 4 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (“Under this view, what the
Constitution means could change with each generation, not due to evolution in
authoritative pronouncements from the Supreme Court, but from successful organization
and persuasion by political leaders and the mass public.”).  See generally Post & Siegel, Roe
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that constitutional interpretation is often democratically responsive as a
descriptive matter, the claim goes, but that it is also normatively desirable
and legitimacy-enhancing for judges to account for the authority of con-
temporary popular culture.198  As one of us has written, however, if
originalism is itself a product of democratic culture, it complicates the
normative implications of popular constitutionalism for judicial
method.199  Our data are quite consistent with this possibility, and sug-
gest the need for a well-developed account of the collapsing wall between
methodological and popular discourse.  For those who view judicial inter-
pretation as appropriately in dialogue with popular interpretation, much
is at stake in diagnosing stated popular preferences for particular ap-
proaches to judicial decisionmaking.  Perry’s conclusion—that we are all
now originalists but that none of us is now an originalist—might apply
increasingly beyond the legal profession itself.
Another one of us has written of the need to ground the valuable
insights of popular constitutionalism in the empirical data on which it
relies for its sustenance.200  Not all studies rely on quantitative data, of
course,201 but some of them do, and such research is rarely present in the
popular constitutionalism discourse.202  This study provides several data
points in the ongoing effort to fill that gap.  We have referred above to
the longstanding criticism of public opinion data, both within law and
Rage, supra note 22, at 374 (articulating theory of “democratic constitutionalism” that R
describes the process through which constitutional meaning emerges from interpretive
contest among citizens).
198. See Kramer, supra note 22, at 252–53 (“[T]he authority of judicial decisions R
[should] formally and explicitly depend[ ] on reactions from the other branches and,
through them, from the public.”); Robert C. Post, Foreword:  Fashioning the Legal
Constitution:  Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8 (2003) (“[T]he Court in
fact commonly constructs constitutional law in the context of an ongoing dialogue with
culture, so that culture is inevitably (and properly) incorporated into the warp and woof of
constitutional law.”).
199. See Greene, Selling Originalism, supra note 12, at 701 (“[M]any non-originalist R
theoretical models need not only to acknowledge but also to accommodate the success of
originalism as a political practice.”).
200. See Persily, supra note 197, at 5 (“Curiously absent from the literature on R
popular constitutionalism or the countermajoritarian difficulty is any evaluation of what
‘the people themselves’ actually think about the issues the Supreme Court has
considered.”).
201. Recent books by Barry Friedman and Larry Kramer in the popular
constitutionalist tradition, for example, have used historical “data” to valuable effect.  See
generally Friedman, Will of the People, supra note 22 (chronicling history of Supreme R
Court’s apparent responsiveness to popular opinion); Kramer, supra note 22 (describing R
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century history of influence of citizen opinion on
constitutional interpretation).
202. See Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive:  The Nature and
Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1257, 1272–73 (2004) (explaining that
empirically studying judicial behavior has limitations and difficulties because it “requires
data that one can code and count” and therefore “tend[s] to focus on judicial votes rather
than the language of the opinions themselves, a shortcoming whose seriousness is
obvious”).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\111-2\COL204.txt unknown Seq: 60  3-FEB-11 13:37
2011] PROFILING ORIGINALISM 415
political science, that Americans do not have sophisticated views on con-
stitutional issues.  Our data do not prove otherwise, but they do gesture in
a different direction.  Along with Gibson and Caldeira, we worry that as-
sessments of political knowledge too readily mistake jargon and policy
detail for substantive position-taking.203  The degree of political and legal
knowledge necessary to answer a survey question competently depends
on the uses to which the questioner intends to put the data.204  Public
views on originalism might not be especially relevant to determining how
the Supreme Court should answer a particular constitutional question,
but might be highly relevant to assessing the value of originalism as a
“brand” within, for example, the politics of judicial confirmation fights.
We might ask similar questions about the value of, say, minimalism or
adherence to stare decisis.  Inquiring senators want to know.
Political science has an older analog to the popular constitutionalism
turn within law.  Much of the American political development literature
has long rejected the countermajoritarian difficulty, and many political
scientists remain mystified at the legal academic obsession with the puta-
tive tension between majoritarian democracy and judicial review.  Judicial
decisionmaking, these scholars have argued, is rarely far out of line from
the policy preferences of the dominant political regime; the interesting
questions within this literature are not whether judges roll with political
tides, but through what sorts of mechanisms—institutional or idea-
tional—and how.205  Legal scholars have long underused political science
203. Gibson and Caldeira note that:
When we allow the respondents to tell us which issues are important to them, we
touch on highly salient concerns and consequently find remarkably high levels of
information about the perceived policy location of the nominee.  Moreover, a
new revisionist literature is developing that shows that the American people are
vastly more knowledgeable about courts than heretofore thought . . . .
Gibson & Caldeira, Confirmation Politics, supra note 40, at 147 n.17. R
204. See Arthur Lupia, How Elitism Undermines the Study of Voter Competence, 18
Critical Rev. 217, 219 (2006) (“Political-knowledge questions test information that
academics, journalists, and politicos value.  The answers to these questions help such
people accomplish important tasks.  The elitist move is when such people assume that
these questions have a similar value to citizens whose societal responsibilities can be very
different from their own.”).
205. See generally Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make:  Leadership
from John Adams to Bill Clinton (1997) (identifying four phases in presidential politics
over time, from leadership strategies based on relationships among elites, to more populist
political approach based on public support); Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of
Judicial Supremacy:  The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership
in U.S. History (2007) (arguing presidents and political leaders have found it in their best
interest to insulate Supreme Court and encourage justices to be ultimate interpreters of
Constitution); see also Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:  The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 294 (1957) (arguing Court is least
effective in making policy “against a current lawmaking majority—and evidently least
inclined to act,” while Court is most effective when setting “the bounds of policy for
officials, agencies, state governments or even regions, a task that has come to occupy a very
large part of the Court’s business”); Brian J. Glenn, The Two Schools of American Political
Development, 2 Pol. Stud. Rev. 153, 159–61 (2004) (analyzing distinction between two
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literature, but the reasons for that are also both institutional and idea-
tional.  There are insufficient efforts at and opportunities for cross-polli-
nation of legal and political science scholarship, but there is also a frus-
tration among many legal academics at the ready dismissal by many
political scientists of the possibility of judicial independence.  Many aca-
demic lawyers have worked intimately with judges, on both sides of the
bench, and accordingly doubt that judges feel as unconstrained as much
of the political science literature seems both to presuppose and ulti-
mately to conclude.206
We would not be so immodest as to suggest that the data examined
here offer a way out of the impasse, such as it exists.  But we do believe it
important to take note of the emphasis so many Americans seem to place
on rule of law values, and the preference many rule of law Americans
have for originalism.  Forty percent of those who believe it is “very impor-
tant” to strictly follow the law no matter what people in the country may
want are originalists.207  Even if we all agree that judicial decisionmaking
is responsive to the policy views of the public, perhaps channeled imper-
fectly through political actors, we might also agree that interpretivism is
part of the bundle of preferences that gets communicated to judges.  Just
as Keith Whittington has persuasively argued that there is a political mar-
ket for judicial supremacy,208 our results gesture at a political market for
judicial constraint, or at least the appearance of it.209
CONCLUSION
Had we put our survey to 1,677 lawyers, judges, and legal academics
rather than 1,677 lay Americans, we would expect originalists to com-
prise, in large measure, formalists who believe that judges must strictly
follow the law, social conservatives, libertarians, and people opposed to
Roe and gay rights and supportive of gun rights.  Divisions among the
public over the constitutional authority of “original intentions” appear to
reflect many of the same divisions that arise among legal sophisticates.
main schools of American political development scholarship); Mark A. Graber, From the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty to Juristocracy and the Political Construction of Judicial
Power, 65 Md. L. Rev. 1, 6–14 (2006) (examining causes and consequences of judiciary’s
recent expansion in power).
206. See Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism:  Can a
New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 61, 104 (2009) (“[F]or
attitudinalists, judging is explained primarily (or, depending on the scholar, at least in
significant part) by political inclination.”).
207. See Constitutional Attitudes Survey, supra note 20, Question 102a (2009), at 20, R
51–54; see also supra Table 8a.
208. See generally Whittington, supra note 205, at 4–5 (describing development of R
judicial supremacy and how it responds to interests of political branches and government
actors).
209. See Greene, Selling Originalism, supra note 12, at 708–13 (arguing originalism R
responds to popular demand for simplicity, populism, and nativism in constitutional
method).
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The fact that our assumptions about legally knowledgeable respondents
have some overlap with the actual survey responses of the general public
suggests that originalism has been translated into common parlance with
some success.  If originalism has indeed been translated from a complex
tool of professional interpretation into a topic of popular discourse, then
the interesting questions become when, by whom, and through what
mechanisms.  These questions exceed the scope of our study, which has
focused on gathering relevant data and suggesting why it is useful to
gather more of it.  Those data are consistent with the notion that a prefer-
ence for originalism in a survey does not just reflect an incoherent reflex,
but expresses a substantive legal, political, and cultural preference.  The
interesting part of Perry’s question of whether we are all originalists
might not be who are the “originalists,” but rather who are the “we.”210
At the same time, popular attitudes toward originalism show a cer-
tain incommensurability with other attitudes people hold.  They coexist
with support for adherence to precedent, for respect for majority will,
and for constitutional rights—the right to privacy, for example—with a
strained connection to the Constitution’s original meaning.  These re-
sults may well reflect that people simply do not understand questions
about constitutional interpretation, or at least that they do not under-
stand what follows from their answers.  Alternatively, it may reflect that
constitutional interpretation is not solely the province of elite profes-
sional opinion.  Ordinary citizens have views on constitutional argument,
and those views may not be severable from political or cultural views.  The
challenge to legal professionals, particularly academics, is to map these
relationships, and to develop a fuller understanding of both the limits
and the possibilities of constitutional interpretation “out of doors.”211
Future research should aim both to better understand preferences
for originalism and to understand its rather inchoate alternative.  Is the
relative religious fundamentalism of originalists bound up with a particu-
lar cultural worldview,212 or might it also be grounded in views about the
interpretation of sacred texts?213  Can we slice the Cultural Hypothesis
210. See supra note 7 (noting Perry’s belief that “[t]here is a sense in which we are all R
originalists”).
211. See Kramer, supra note 22, at 46–47 (using phrase “people out-of-doors” to R
describe force of popular politics as interpretive impetus); cf. Siegel, supra note 16, at 192 R
(“Heller’s originalism enforces understandings of the Second Amendment that were forged
in the late twentieth century through popular constitutionalism.”).
212. See Jill Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes:  The Tea Party’s Revolution and the
Battle over American History 15–16 (2010) (noting that having a worldview that says “that
we are there, or the Founding Fathers are here, or that we have forsaken them and they’re
rolling over in their graves because of the latest, breaking political development” is to
believe in “a set of assumptions about the relationship between the past and the present
stricter, even, than the strictest form of constitutional originalism, a set of assumptions
that, conflating originalism, evangelicalism, and heritage tourism, amounts to a variety of
fundamentalism”).
213. See Jaroslav Pelikan, Interpreting the Bible and the Constitution 38–39 (2004)
(comparing Biblical and constitutional interpretation); Greene, Origins, supra note 166, at R
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more finely and generate other independent variables of significance in
predicting originalist attitudes?  Is “changing times” a coherent view, or
just an incoherent default?  At the same time that most Americans choose
“changing times,” they also believe it is important for judges to strictly
follow the law no matter what people in the country may want, and to
uphold the values of the Constitution’s authors.  Are nonoriginalists,
then, even more or equally susceptible to the charge of incoherence we
hear lodged against originalists?
Our analysis is a start, and we invite both imitation and criticism.
Above all, we hope to have provided a resource for a wide range of inter-
ested parties, tea or otherwise.
78–81 (noting parallels between attitudes toward constitutional interpretation and
attitudes toward Biblical interpretation).
